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Introduction
Host Government Instruments (“HGIs”) aim to regulate and manage
exploration and production activities (“E&P” or “Upstream”), between the
resource owner (typically the State) and oil and gas company or a
consortium of oil and gas companies (typically International Oil Companies
(“IOCs”)).1 Although there are different types of HGIs, it is necessary for
1. For further information about HGIs see: Anthony Jennings, Oil and Gas
Exploration Contracts (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008), Anthony Jennings (ed),
Oil and Gas Production Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008), Bernard G. Taverne,
An Introduction to the Regulation of the Petroleum Industry: Law, Contracts and
Conventions (Graham & Trotman, London 1994), Bernard. G. Taverne, Co-Operative
Agreements in the Extractive Petroleum Industry (Kluwer Law International, Hague 1996),
Bernard. G. Taverne, Petroleum, Industry and Governments: A study of the Involvement of
Industry and Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum (2nd edn Kluwer Law
International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2008), Eduardo G. Pereira (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of
Oil and Gas Law, Volume One: Upstream (2nd edn Globe Law and Business 2020),
Eduardo G. Pereira, Kim Talus (eds.), Upstream Law and Regulation: A Global Guide
Volume 1 – Africa and the Americas (2nd edn Globe Law and Business 2017), Eduardo G.
Pereira, Kim Talus (eds.), Upstream Law and Regulation: A Global Guide Volume 2 –
Europe, Middle East, Asia and Australia (2nd edn. Globe Law and Business 2017),Chris
Thorpe, Fundamentals of Upstream Petroleum Agreements (CP Thorpe, UK 2008), Claude
Duval and others, International Petroleum and Exploration Agreements: Legal, Economic &
Policy Aspects (2nd edn Barrows, New York 2009), Daniel Jonhston, International
Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis (PenWell, Tulsa 2003), Daniel
Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and production sharing contracts
(Penwell, Oklahoma 1994), Ernest E. Smith and others, International Petroleum
Transactions (3rd edn RMMLF, Westminster 2010), Greg Gordon, John Paterson (eds), Oil
and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends (DUP, Dundee 2007), Henry Cattan,
The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa (Oceana, New York
1967), Kirsten Bindemann, Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis (Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford 1999), Khong Cho Oon, The Politics of Oil in
Indonesia: Foreign Company-Host Governments Relations (CUP, Cambridge 2009), Martyn
R. David, Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1996),
Muhammed Mazeel, Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Contracts (Diplomica Verlag, 2010
Hamburg), P.H. Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum: A key to Oil Economics (2nd Frank Cass,
London 1976), Raymond F. Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations & Agreements in the
Developing Countries (Resources for the Future, Washington 1984), Tengku Nathan
Machand, The Indonesian Production Sharing Contract: An Investor Perspective (Kluwer
Law International, Hague 2000), Terence Daintith, Geoffrey Willoughby (eds), Adrian Hill,
United Kingdom Oil & Gas Law (3rd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2009), Thomas E.
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the terms and conditions of each HGI to manage the expectations of
investors and guarantee suitable protection for any investments, while
achieving the main objectives of the relevant host nation which might vary
from country-to-country (e.g. energy security, economic development, local
employment, etc).2
Despite many global variations of HGIs, there are – broadly speaking –
two main approaches that Host Governments (“HG”) can adopt to allow
third parties to explore and/or exploit their petroleum resources. These are a
legislation-based approach (via license-granting) and a contract-based
approach.3 Nevertheless, both approaches combine contractual arrangement
and regulations. 4
This paper focuses on the HGIs falling into the contract-based category,
defined as,
[a]rrangements between foreign investors and host countries for
the development of natural resources have carried many names:
Ward, Negotiations for Oil Concessions in Bahrain, El Hasa (Saudi Arabia), The Neutral
Zone, Qatar and Kuwait (Ardles, New York 1965), Thomas W. Walde (ed.) & George K.
Ndi (ed.), International Oil and Gas Investments, Moving Eastward? (Graham &
Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, London 1994), A. Konoplianik, ´PSA Debate: Getting rid of
rival`[2003] OGEL, A. Konoplianik, ´The fight against PSA in Russia, Who is to Benefit
and why not the State?`(2003) 3 OGEL 1, Aida Avanessian ´Buy-back - the main mode of
contracting in petroleum projects in Iran` (2009) 5 I.E.L.R. 167-170, Ian Rutledge, ‘The
Sakhalin II PSA – a Production ‘Non-Sharing’ Agreement, Analysis of Revenue
Distribution’ (2004) SERIS, Jacinta Jackson, Peter Roberts, ´The Iranian buyback
concession: the principle and the prospects` (2001) 7 I.E.L.T.R. 159-161,Paul Stevens,
‘National Oil Companies and International Oil Companies in the Middle East: Under the
Shadow of Government and the Resource Nationalism Cycle’ (2008) 1 Journal of World
Energy Law & Business 5;
2. Kim Talus, Scott Looper and Steven Otillar, ‘Lex Petrolea and the
Internationalization of Petroleum Agreements: Focus on Host Government Contracts’ (2012)
5 The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 181.
3. It is worth noting that, broadly speaking, “license based petroleum legislation has
been, in recent times, almost exclusively adopted in western countries, i.e. in countries with
a developed economy and an advanced, sophisticated legal system, all of which happen to be
member states of the Organisation for Economic and Development (OECD). In non-western
countries, i.e. countries with a developing or emerging economy, the present day petroleum
legislation is based on and centered around state participation in combination with a contract
of work, the latter almost exclusively in the form of the production sharing contract”
Taverne, B. 2013, Petroleum, Industry and Governments. Wolters Kluwer. p.157.
4. Omowumi O Iledare, ‘Analyzing the Impact of Petroleum Fiscal Arrangements and
Contract Terms on Petroleum E&P Economics and the Host Government Take’, Nigeria
Annual International Conference and Exhibition (Society of Petroleum Engineers 2004).
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“concession agreement,” “economic development agreement,”
“service contract,” “work contract,” “joint venture contract,”
“production-sharing agreement,”
and,
most
recently,
“participation agreement.” Occasionally, within particular
countries, the distinctions in terminology are significant in
differentiating various forms of arrangements. In other instances,
varying terminologies relate to agreements of essentially the
same nature. In other cases, the same terminology has been
utilised in one country for agreements which are, in substance,
quite different from each other.5
In general, the contractual approach of HGIs is grouped into three main
categories: firstly, concession agreements, secondly, production-sharing
contracts (“PSCs”) and thirdly, service contracts.6 Although these three
categories are the most common forms available in the oil and gas industry
they might not exist in their pure form as some features of each form could
be combined in a hybrid model or two or more HGIs could exist in the
same host country in different or same areas. In addition, although they will
not be covered by this paper, one should note that in certain specific and
less common cases a fifth and sixth options could exist via joint venture
agreement and as reconnaissance/study agreement. The former is a fairly
unusual model for an HGI but it is far more commonly used between oil
and gas companies to share their costs and risks in a given HGI. 7 The
former (joint venture agreement) is rarely adopted in the modern days (i.e.
Qatar). This is why it will only be briefly mentioned in our Appendix for
“historical” reasons. The latter will not be covered in this paper nor
Appendix as they deal with preliminary form of agreements which could
lead to a HGI.
In any case, HGs and IOCs might prefer a particular type of HGI. There
is a perception that the HG or the IOCs might be more protected with one
type as opposed to another.8 Quite often HGs modify their legal system to
5. David N Smith and Louis T Wells, ‘Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries:
Structures and Substance’ (1975) 69 American Journal of International Law 560.
6. See note 1. Kirsten Bindemann, Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic
Analysis (OIES 1999) 9.
7. Ibid.
8. .For more information see Eduardo G. Pereira, Damilola S. Olawuyi (eds.),
Practical Considerations to Negotiate an Enforceable Joint Operating Agreement Under
Civil Law Jurisdictions (Kluwer International Law 2020), Eduardo G. Pereira, Joint
Operating Agreements: Risk Control for the Non-Operator (Globe Law and Business 2nd
edn. 2018), Eduardo G. Pereira, Wan M. Z. Wan Zahari (eds), Joint Operating Agreement
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incorporate a new type of HGI or implement new features to an existing
HGI.
This paper aims to explore the following questions: (1) what are the key
differences between contract based HGIs? (2) Does it matter what type of
HGI the HGs offer and if so, is there a better one? (3) Why HGIs keep
changing and can stabilization truly be achived?
In order to answer the research questions, the article is structured as
follows. Section 1 briefly defines the three types of contractual HGIs.
Sections 2 through 4 describe in greater detail the similarities and
differences between HGIs in regard to ownership of resources, HGs’
intervention and control and fiscal term. Section 5 reviews the pursuit of
stabilization of HGIs. Section 6 provides a discussion and answers the
research questions, followed by the paper’s conclusions.
The paper draws on the most common forms of HGI and the experience
of a variety of jurisdictions (including but not limited to the United
Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, among others). Nevertheless, the paper does not purport to be
specific to any specific jurisdiction, thus examples are solely used to
illustrate the various points and general principles.
1. Defining Host Governmental Instruments
Before the article engages in the discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages arising from the type of HGI chosen, it is useful to first
define and identify the characteristics of each instrument. However, it is not
the main goal of this paper to overview such preliminary information in
detail even though it might be useful information. For this reason, further
details and examples about these HGIs can be found on appendix A of this
paper as well as on relevant footnotes. 9
As previously mentioned, HGIs could be divided between two types of
systems. Regulatory and contractual based systems. Regulatory-based
systems are the HGIs developed via regulations and are typically less
flexible for negotiation. Two examples are licenses and public leases.
Contractual based systems are the HGIs developed via contracts and they
tend to allow more flexibility for negotiations. Some examples include the
concession agreement, production sharing agreement, and service contracts.
Nevertheless, some HGIs might exhibit a duality between contractual and
(JOA): Applicability and Enforceability of Default Provisions (RMMLF 2018). Eduardo G.
Pereira (ed.), Understanding Joint Operating Agreements (Intersentia 2016).
9. Smith and others (n 1).
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regulatory nature, such as in the UK or the joint venture agreement used in
Qatar.10
In a nutshell, the main characteristics between the most common
contractual-based HGI are:
Elements

Concession

Risk

The investor
takes all
financial and
technical risks.

Resources

The HG tends
to own all the
reserves in the
country.
However,
investor tends
to own all
production and
pay “taxes”.

Production
Sharing
Contracts (PSC)
The investor
takes all
financial and
technical risks.

Services Contracts

The HG owns all
the reserves in
the country.
However,
investor tends
to receive a
share of the
production and
is reimbursed
some costs but
might pay
“taxes”.

Pure Service

Risk Service

All financial and
technical risks
are taken by HG.

The investor takes all
financial and technical
risks.

The HG owns all
the reserves and
production in
the country.
Investor might
be paid in fee
and/or in kind
and is
reimbursed
some costs but
might be subject
to “tax”.

The HG owns all the
reserves and
production in the
country. Investor might
be paid in fee and/or in
kind and reimbursed
some costs but might
be subject to tax.
Nevertheless, the
investor should have a
“premium” or higher
fee in comparison to a
pure service contract
due to the additional
risks.

2. Ownership of Resources
Notwithstanding the HGI model used, the HG will usually have
ownership of the oil and gas resources before their extraction (with the
10. In some jurisdictions a joint venture with a government entity is required to develop
resources. This is not a common approach adopted by host governments but rather between
oil and gas companies in order to share the risks and costs agreed in a relevant HGI.
However, there are some exceptions like Qatar still persist but it was adopted more widely in
the past decades in the MENA region. Qatar has been trending away from production
sharing agreements to joint ventures. The North Oil Company is a joint venture with the
NOC, Qatar Petroleum, and Total developing and producing on of the largest and most
complex oil fields in the world, the Al-Shaheen Field. Mahmmod S., Oil and Gas
Regulation in Qatar: Overview, Thompson Reuters: Practical Law.
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exception of those countries where the ownership of the mineral resources
lies with the owner of the land or in the case of historical concessions). 11
The critical point for the HGIs is the precise moment of the transfer of
ownership of the resources to the IOCs.
Generally, in the concession model, the property in oil and gas is
transferred immediately to the IOC upon production (e.g., at the wellhead)
or in another moment defined by the parties. Under the concessionary
system, the oil and gas companies are usually given right over a particular
area, including access to potential reserves contained in the field and any
related production.12 In exchange for these rights, the concessionaire is
obliged to pay the government the royalties and/or taxes.13
Under the PSC, the production is owned by the HG, and the IOC’s share
is transferred to it at a point determined by the parties (e.g., an export or
measurement point). 14 However, the precise share allocation depends on
the agreed terms of the relevant PSC.
For Service Contracts, there is no mandatory transfer of ownership of
the produced resources. The compensation of the IOC may be part of the
production, and in such a case this would be at a designated point for
transfer. Alternatively, the IOC may be entitled to purchase the oil at a
discounted price (here, there would also be a specific point determined for
the transfer, or a specific fee and reimbursed costs might be paid by the
IOC for a certain amount of production). 15 This would depend on how the
compensation for the IOC is set under each service contract.
PSCs and Service Contracts are similar, but not identical; the main
distinction is that Service Contracts reimburse IOCs in cash rather than in
kind. 16 Moreover, Service Contracts provide compensation for the
contractor either on a fixed-fee basis at defined periods (with possibilities
11. N. BRET-ROUZAUT & J.P. FAVENNEC, OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION:
RESERVES, COSTS, CONTRACTS
(Editions Technip, 2011), p 171. Also Estudos de
Alternativas Regulatórias, Institucionais e Financeiras para a Exploração e Produção de
Petróleo e Gás Natural e para o Desenvolvimento Industrial da Cadeia Produtiva de
Petróleo
e
Gás
Natural
no
Brasil,
available
at
www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/.../
RelConsol-2de6.pdf (accessed on October 2019).
12. Ibid.
13. BRET-ROUZAUT & FAVENNEC, 2011, p 174.
14. Id. at 174-175.
15. Abbas Ghandi and CY Cynthia Lin, ‘Oil and Gas Service Contracts around the
World: A Review’ [2014] Energy Strategy Reviews.
16. Rex J Zedalis, Claims Against Iraqi Oil and Gas: Legal Considerations and Lessons
Learned (Cambridge University Press 2010) 189.
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of incremental fees), or upon completion plus some cost recovery in certain
instances.17
Regardless of the ownership of the resources, under normal
circumstances in the PSC and concession systems, the IOCs may book the
reserves in their accounting system. This is relevant for IOCs as it
represents one of the financial indicators that investors and shareholders
examine to verify the economic status of the company.18 The IOCs cannot
normally book reserves under a Service Contract because mere contractors
as a service provider have no ownership over reserves or production.
However, an exception might be made for RSC where the IOCs take certain
risks and therefore might have some ownership rights.
Regarding the ownership of goods, equipment and data, there are four
types of ownership: (i) host government property; (ii) property of the IOCs,
but transferred to host government upon termination of HGIs; (iii) shared
property between IOC and Host Government; and (iv) property of the
IOCs.19
While ownership issues may not be directly linked to the HGI model, the
type implemented creates different operating environments that lead to
ownership questions. For example, under concession models the IOCs
would usually take ownership of goods, equipment and data.20 However,
the ownership of the data (e.g. seismic data) acquired might be more
restricted as it is more likely to be the property of the host government. 21 It
is important to note however, that IOCs often keep their intellectual
property under any HGI.22
17. See fn. 67 above, p.
18. .Oil companies must tell investors how much oil they have access to, because this is
a key indicator of their ability to maintain production and therefore revenues. Companies
generally prefer Concession systems because this system allows the company to list all
reserves in its books. In a PSC, it can list only the barrels it keeps. Thus if a company agrees
to give the Government 70 percent of the oil from a field, it can book only the remaining 30
percent.
19. .Estudos de Alternativas Regulatórias, Institucionais e Financeiras para a
Exploração e Produção de Petróleo e Gás Natural e para o Desenvolvimento Industrial da
Cadeia Produtiva de Petróleo e Gás Natural no Brasil, available at
www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/.../
RelConsol-2de6.pdf (accessed on 10th October 2019).
20. Ghandi and Lin (n 15).
21. A Timothy Martin and J Jay Park, ‘Global Petroleum Industry Model Contracts
Revisited: Higher, Faster, Stronger’ (2010) 3 The Journal of World Energy Law & Business
4.
22. Lauren E Godshall, ‘Making Space for Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights
under Current International Environmental Law’ (2002) 15 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 497.
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In contrast, in PSCs, the property of the equipment and infrastructure
installed by the IOCs are usually transferred to the host government (except
for leased goods in some jurisdictions). 23 A debate often occurs on PSCs or
RSC about the precise timing of this transfer of ownership. Should this
transfer take place at the time of the cost recovery, or should it occur at the
end of the contract? Usually, it is going to be the formerunless the contract
terminates earlier since the IOC is less likely to retain ownership acquired
in relation to the project in a PSC system. This system does not encourage
IOCs to acquire goods or property until they know that there is enough
production to offset these costs.
Finally, in service contracts, the HG or its NOC is usually the operator
of the field, and the IOCs are similar to service providers. Therefore, the
host government owns the goods, equipment and data related to such
contracts.
3. Host Government Intervention and Control
When deciding its E&P legal framework, a HG takes into accounts both
economic and tax benefits, but also social and political pressures. The latter
play a significant role in this decision, especially in developing countries. 24
The following sub-headings are going to explore different layers of HG
intervention and control over oil and gas resources.
3.1. Intervention and Control from a HG Perspective
One of the critical issues is the level of intervention and control desired
by the HG.25 For example, under the concession system, the State provides
an instrument to make a legal arrangement with the concessionaire to
develop oil and gas resources of the State. The instrument lays down the
terms and conditions of the said arrangement, as well as rights and duties
between the concessionaire and States under both public and private laws. 26
The HG will grant exclusive rights to a concessionaire for hydrocarbon
E&P in a given area over a specified period. Upon signing the agreement,
the concessionaire has the right to conduct exploration and, if successful in
23. Smith and others (n 1).
24. Daniel Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing
Contracts (PennWell Books 1994) 5–6.
25. Daniel Johnston, International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis
(PennWell Books 2003) 3.
26. Kenneth S Carlston, ‘Concession Agreements and Nationalization’ (1958) 52
American Journal of International Law 260.
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making a commercial discovery, to develop it.27 Typically the
concessionaire also has the right to take ownership of the oil and gas
produced and to dispose of such production without restriction.
In short, the main characteristic of the concession system is the latitude
of “freedom” given for the investor to explore and develop oil and gas
resources even though more restrictions and control could be imposed in
this type of HGI. 28
3.1.1. Field Development Monitorization, National Market Quotas &
State Participation
Although the modern concession might entail more discretion to oil and
gas companies, it is not a “free pass” as it once was common under older
concessions. The HGs have learned that retaining certain controls over their
resources is in their best interest. For example, a HG often approves a field
development plan before any production phase. Additionally, it can secure
higher participation over the field production by either requesting the fiscal
consideration to be paid in kind, or by establishing a domestic market
obligation to secure supplies of oil and gas production for its nation,
although the investor might consider national obligations negatively when
deciding to enter a country.29 This scenario could be seen in the Malaysian
regime where the oil and gas companies had been previously operating
under a concession system during British protectorate. 30 Post-independence,
Malaysia inherited and continued using the same concession system.
Nevertheless, after the 1973 oil embargo, the oil-producing countries of the
world realised the importance of monitoring and having closer control over
their petroleum resources. 31 In Malaysia, it led to the legislation of the
Petroleum Development Act (PDA) in 1974 and the formation of a NOC to
ensure that the nation’s petroleum resources could be developed in line with

27. Rovicky Dwi Putrohari and others, ‘PSC Term and Conditions and Its
Implementation in South East Asia Region’ [2007] Proceedings Indonesian Petroleum
Association, Thirty-First Annual Convention and Exhibition, May 2007 PSC.
28. Smith and others (n 1).
29. Nutavoot Pongsiri, ‘Partnerships in Oil and Gas Production-Sharing Contracts’
(2004) 17 Int. J. Public Sector Mgmt. 431, 432.
30. Wan Mohd Zulhafiz Wan Zahari, ‘Kisah Hak Minyak, Gas Sarawak’ Utusan Online
(2018); Wan Mohd Zulhafiz Wan Zahari, ‘Minyak Dan Gas Di Sarawak: Menurut Kaca
Mata Sejarah Dan Undang-Undang’ Malaysian Digest (2018).
31. Mohamad Kamal Hamdan and others, ‘Enhanced Oil Recovery in Malaysia:
Making It a Reality’, SPE Asia Pacific Oil and Gas Conference and Exhibition (SPE 2005).
Hamdan and others.
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the desires and wishes of the nation and a new HGI was put in place as
described on Appendix A.32
The participation of a NOC could also influence whether the HG should
choose a more interventionist model. 33 In relation to this, the NOC’s
majority or preferential participation could be mandated with access to
strategic areas, pre-emption rights, and carried interest or there could be a
more open market approach where the IOC and the NOC compete for the
same acreage on a level playing field. 34
For example, in Brazil, an issue arose as to the importance of
implementing a “new” petroleum regime to develop the Pre-Salt area.35
This change arose from political motivations and the objectives to increase
government take and control of the operations, which are directly related to
the rationale behind the PSC system. 36 It is possible to suggest that the
creation of the Pré-Sal Petróleo S.A. (PPSA), as the “manager” of the local
PSC regime, and the PSC system itself, has a clear political motivation, as
supported by several authors,37 such as John Gault:
“The primary difference between a well-designed PSC and a
well-designed tax and royalty system is not economic but
political: the PSC gives the appearance that the host country
NOC remains the owner of the reserves in the ground until they
are produced. I have always assumed that this appearance was
32. Wan Zulhafiz, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977: Does It Provide a Good Model in
Regulating Risk Allocation Provisions in Oilfield Contracts in Malaysia?’ (2015) 8
International Journal of Trade and Global Markets 3, 5.
33. Robert L Pirog, ‘The Role of National Oil Companies in the International Oil
Market’ (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 2007) 5; Silvana Tordo,
National Oil Companies and Value Creation (World Bank Publications 2011).
34. Marilu Hastings, ‘A New Operational Paradigm for Oil Operations in Sensitive
Environments: An Analysis of Social Pressure, Corporate Capabilities and Competitive
Advantage’ (1999) 8 Business Strategy and the Environment 267.
35. The ‘pre-salt area’ is described in the Federal Law No 12.351/2010 (“Pre-salt Law”)
and subject to a production sharing regime.
36. Eduardo G. Pereira, “Governmental Participation in Upstream Projects: The
Brazilian Pre-Salt Case,” UEF Energy Law Review (2016) 1.
37. Johnston has the same perspective as he states that ´At first PSCs and concessionary
systems appear to be quite different. They have major symbolic and philosophical
differences, but these serve more of a political function than anything else.` Daniel Johnston,
International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and production sharing contracts (Penwell,
Oklahoma 1994), p. 39. In addition, Bindemann suggests in his conclusion that “In that
sense it can be argued that a PSA is a political rather than an economic contract.” Kirsten
Bindemann, Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis (Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, Oxford 1999), p. 88.
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the primary reason why some host governments introduced PSCs
in the first place.”38
Although most developing countries face popular claims to protect
national resources and feel uncomfortable delegating proprietary rights to
an IOC, this, in theory, should not apply to the current Brazilian scenario as
the state monopoly was relaxed in 1995 and was working reasonably well
for over ten years.39 However, sustained political stability is hard to achieve
in any country, and the changes within the Brazilian upstream sector seem
to be a regressive measure towards national restriction of private and
foreign investment. 40 Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that some of
the restrictions of the PSA regime (e.g. operatorship) have been made more
flexible due to the financial crises and scandals suffered by Petrobras.41
Further details about the evolution of the Brazilian HGI can be found on
Appendix A.
It is also important to bear in mind that state participation from an HG
point of view can vary due to certain aspects such as, total state control of
the activity under Service Contracts, shared control in a PSC between the
NOC and the IOCs or the sole regulation and audit of activities under the
concession agreement.42 For instance, while the HG is usually the most
participative under Service Contracts, theoretically it also assumes higher
risks under this type of agreement. 43 Therefore, the HG is unlikely to use
this system for exploration activities, as it would prefer to use a Risk
Service Contract where risks are delegated to the investor. 44 In these
agreements, the government contracts with an IOC to conduct a specific
technical service regarding the exploitation of petroleum resources within a

38. J Gault, ‘Crude Designs: The Rip-Off of Iraq’s Oil Wealth-A Comment’ (2007) 5
Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal (OGEL). The author uses the term ‘agreement’ instead of
‘contract’. We have replaced it in the acronym for consistency reasons.
39. Fabrício Germano Alves and Yanko Marcius de Alencar Xavier, ‘The Evolution of
Brazilian Oil, Gas and Biofuel Industry Regulations’, Energy Law in Brazil (Springer 2015)
33–56.
40. Ibid.
41. See Federal Decree no. 9.041/2017.
42. Abbas Ghandi and CY Cynthia Lin, ‘Oil and Gas Service Contracts around the
World: A Review’ (2014) 3 Energy Startergy Rev. 63.
43. Christopher Hood, ‘The Risk Game and the Blame Game’ (2002) 37 Government
and opposition 15.
44. Eugene F Fama, ‘Contract Costs and Financing Decisions’ [1990] Journal of
Business S71.
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stipulated period, while retaining the ownership, control, risk, and reward. 45
In this sense, a Service Contract could have a “pure” nature (without risks)
or a “hybrid” nature (with risks) and becoming similar to a PSC.46
At the same time, it should be noted that the role of the NOC varies from
country to country. It could possess regulatory or commercial roles and
sometimes both. 47 In some instances, the NOC might have more “power
and control” than the actual government. This was the case in Mexico and
Brazil during their “monopoly” period due to their regulatory powers,
expertise and financial resources.48 In other cases, the NOC might have a
purely commercial role, in which it could be involved from the exploration
stage or after finding and developing a commercial discovery. 49 Such
involvement could be exercised via regulatory and compulsory procedures,
or voluntarily by the decision of the relevant investors.50
Even under the arrangement of PSCs, the level of intervention depends
on the actual contractual structure, including the position of the NOC, i.e.
whether an NOC will operate the project, or whether it is focused on
learning from the IOCs during the exploration phase of the PSC or even if
the NOC will join later in the development stage whenever the exploratory
risks were mitigated. 51 The E&P activities in a PSC are conducted in a
manner similar to those covered by the concession system or Risk Service
Contract with the risks and costs being borne by the investor.
3.1.3 Control and Intervention in Concession Agreements
Regarding controlling mechanisms, under the Concession (including
other types of tax regime systems like lease and license), the main role of
the HG is to enact rules and principles guiding the E&P activities of the
IOCs. However, in some cases a NOC might participate in “partnership”

45. Roderick Paisley, ‘Aspects of Land Law Relative to the Transportation of Oil and
Gas in Scotland’ in Greg Gordon, Emre Usenmez and John Paterson (eds), Oil and Gas
Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends (Dundee University Press 2011) 50.
46. Andon J Blake and Mark C Roberts, ‘Comparing Petroleum Fiscal Regimes under
Oil Price Uncertainty’ (2006) 31 Resources Policy 95.
47. Leslie E Grayson, National Oil Companies (Wiley Chichester 1981) 5.
48. Smith and others (n 1).
49. Wan M Zulhafiz, ‘Perception of Contractual Risk Allocation in the Oil and Gas
Contracts in Malaysia’ (2018) 11 International Journal of Trade and Global Markets 127.
50. Jacqueline Lang Weaver and David F Asmus, ‘Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields around
the World: A Comparative Analysis of National Laws and Private Contracts’ (2006) 28
Hous. J. Int’l L. 3.
51. Smith and others (n 1).
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with such companies, like in Brazil or Norway. 52 However, the concession
system could be combined with firm regulatory control consisting of a
range of checks and balances and a variety of host governmental approvals
(e.g. Norway).53
Developed countries do not seek a complete ownership of oil and gas
resources. This is why they tend to use a concession regime or a “variation”
of it (i.e. leases in the United States, licenses in the United Kingdom). 54
Developing nations tend to use a more interventionist approach to secure
the ownership of their resources (such as the PSC models) either to better
understand how the E&P phase actually works and to gain know-how and
expertise, or as a result of political or nationalist feelings concerning
ownership of discovered resources in line with the UN General Assembly
Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 55
Exceptions generated by nationalistic feelings due occur in developed
countries, as in the case of the Danish Sole Concession granted to Maersk.
The choice is also impacted by historical factors. The regime used in the
past tends to become more consolidated and firmly established within a
country’s legal framework, thus limiting the use of diverse models, except
in cases of “unstable” political environment which might encourage the
creation of a new regime like the example from the PSC system in Brazil. 56
In turn, IOCs will mainly use the economic feasibility and returns from any
HGI applied by the host country to decide whether it is worth investing,
regardless of whether it is a Service Contract, Concession or PSC or
something else. 57 The main concern for IOCs is whether the contract

52. .Estudos de Alternativas Regulatórias, Institucionais e Financeiras para a
Exploração e Produção de Petróleo e Gás Natural e para o Desenvolvimento Industrial da
Cadeia Produtiva de Petróleo e Gás Natural no Brasil, available at
www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/.../
RelConsol-2de6.pdf (accessed on 10th October 2018).
53. Efstathios Mavridis, ‘Types of Contracts Used in the Upstream Oil Industry and
Related Issues.’ (International Hellenic University 2018) <https://repository.ihu.edu.
gr//xmlui/handle/11544/29102>.
54. Eduardo Pereira and Kim Talus, ‘Upstream Regulation: An Introduction’ [2013]
University of Eastern Finland Legal Studies Research Paper.
55. Resolution 1803 (XVII) on the “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” of
14 December 1962; accessible from : http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_1803/ga_1803.html
(accessed on October 2018).
56. Smith and others (n 1).
57. Peter D Cameron, ‘Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in
Host Countries: Tools for Oil & Gas Investors’ [2006] Association of International
Petroleum Negotiators.
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provides adequate returns to justify the risk and required investments. 58
However, there are a number of risks that a IOC should consider prior to
engaging in any upstream investment (i.e. geology, infrastructure, political,
legal and tax system, etc).59 These risks certainly include the level of
intervention of a given host government, and the IOCs will have to decide if
they are willing to accept such risks or they invest in another country.60
Further, the nature of the PSCs (including Concession and Risk Service
Contracts) is that they are “risk contracts” where the investor ventures into
oil and gas exploration related investments against the possibility of oil and
gas availability.61 If oil or gas is not found in commercial terms, then IOCs
lose their investment. Otherwise, IOCs are granted a share of oil and gas
produced as specified in the contract in case of commercial success. 62 Some
could argue that PSCs (including Concession and Risk Service Contracts)
might not be appropriate for granting rights to oil and gas reserves that
carry “insufficient” risks.63 Gulf countries with high production levels,
extensive reserves and low operating costs (from reserves mostly located
onshore or in shallow waters) do not normally award a contract with private
IOCs and even in conditions where they do, they do not use PSCs. 64 For
example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and the United Arab Emirates tend to
pay IOCs an agreed compensation for oil exploration and development
rather than a share of the oil and gas. 65 Nevertheless, it is relevant to note
that certain prolific oil and gas reserves are being produced from the US
under a lease type of HGI with relatively low risk and it seems to be
suitable for all relevant stakeholders. 66
In Iraq, misalignment has arisen over whether the Kurdish Regional
Government (“KRG”) has authority to enter into international oil and gas

58. Cameron (n 57).
59. Wan M Zulhafiz, ‘On the Contractual Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Projects’
[2017] The Law Review 168.
60. Cameron (n 57).
61. Tengku Nathan Machmud, The Indonesian Production Sharing Contract: An
Investor’s Perspective (Kluwer Law International 2000) 37.
62. Machmud (n 61).
63. Machmud (n 61).
64. Dunia Chalabi, ‘Perspective Investment in the Middle East/North Africa Region’,
OECD, Istanbul (2004).
65. Gawdat Bahgat, Energy Security: An Interdisciplinary Approach (John Wiley &
Sons 2011) 79; Abdul Hadi Al-Hassani, ‘Iraqi Oil and Gas Law: Between Theory and Facts’
[2007] I.J.E.R (in Arabic) 60, 63.
66. Smith and others (n 1).
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agreements, such as PSCs, which have received widespread criticism. 67 In
Iraq, onshore production costs only a few US dollars per barrel and it might
be argued that there is an insufficient geological risk to justify the use of
PSCs in a number of areas with proven reserves. 68 Iraqi fields hold high
production levels and a low operating cost, which is more common with
onshore than offshore reserves as they are larger and geologically less
complicated.69 Iraqi fields and reservoirs have been specified, determined
and assessed. 70 This is even more evident when considering the geological
structures with no exploratory wells since the possibility of success to find
oil or gas in these structures is among the highest in the world and has been
given a percentage success rate of 70–80 percent.71 However, Iraq and other
countries in this region pose other types of risks, ranging from political
stability to security, which the IOCs should consider before signing any
HGI. 72
In countries with vast reserves, Service Contracts tend to be the preferred
option. 73 The main reason is to comply with constitutional and statutory
restraints on foreign ownership of oil and gas. 74 In Iraq, apart from the
PSCs concluded by the KRG, the Ministry of Oil limits licensing auctions
to service contracts.75
In short, the relevant stakeholders usually search for a balance between
risk and reward. IOCs analyse a large variety of risks (e.g. geological,
technical, environmental, financial, political, security, legal) in order to
understand what best aligns with their desired financial metrics and
corporate profile.

67. See fn. 67 above, p.
68. Smith and others (n 1).
69. Ibid.
70. US Congress, Congressional Record, V. 153, Pt.10, May 22, 2007 to June 5, 2007
(Government Printing Office, 2010), 13679.
71. See fn. 67 above, p.
72. Greg Muttitt, Crude Designs: The Rip-off of Iraq’s Oil Wealth (Platform 2005) 5.
73. See fn. 61 above, p.66.
74. Smith and others (n 1).
75. .US Energy Information Administration, “Iraq” (EIA April 2013), p.12 available at:
www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Iraq/iraq.pdf [Accessed on 22 April 2013].;
Christopher Blanchard, “Iraq: Oil and Gas: Legislation, Revenue Sharing and US Policy”
(2009) 7-5700 CRS 1, available athttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34064.pdf
[Accessed December 9, 2019].
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4. Fiscal terms
An efficient fiscal system should be designed to encourage IOCs to
extensively explore the HG’s sedimentary basins and develop both small
and marginal fields as well as highly profitable fields, to maximise oil and
gas recovery and prevent premature field abandonment.76 In designing any
fiscal regime, the government should endeavour to keep a balance between
its primary objective of maximising its “share” of the project’s economic
rent77 and the IOC’s need for a commercially viable investment. An
efficient fiscal system should not be like a zero-sum game in which there is
a winner or loser, but a positive-sum-game or a win-win game in which
both the HG and IOC benefit, where the level of investment and rewards
are inextricably linked. 78 Long-term stability and simplicity in interpretation
are also essential requirements.
In theory, both HGs and IOCs share the same goal in an HGI, which is to
obtain the highest possible return from a specific project. However, while
host governments attempt to obtain higher values as “government take”
from the revenues obtained from upstream activities, IOCs seek the most
advantageous regimes globally, balancing risks and opportunities.
Thus, the fiscal terms are, undoubtedly, one of the most relevant aspects
of HGIs. As per a International Monetary Fund’s working paper, “[t]he
central fiscal issue is ensuring a ‘reasonable’ government share in the rents
often arising in the EIs”. 79 Rents are “the excess of revenues over all costs
of production, including those of discovery and development, as well as the
normal return to capital”.80 Even though a tax of 100 percent on these rents
would not necessarily render upstream activities unprofitable, as the
standard rate to capital would grant a certain return, there would be no
incentives for IOCs to invest in exploration, development and production. 81

76. Alexander G Kemp and Waniss A Otman, ‘The Petroleum Development Investment
Risks and Returns in Libya: A Monte Carlo Study of the Current Contractual Terms (EPSA
IV)’ [2004] NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPERS.
77. Kemp defines economic rent as ‘returns accruing to a factor of production more than
its transfer earnings. Alexander G Kemp, Petroleum Rent Collection around the World
(IRPP 1987) 5.
78. .LE H Leuch, ‘Petroleum Exploration Production Agreements and Taxation’ [2001]
IFP, France.
79. Carlo Cottarelli, ‘Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and
Implementation’ [2012] International Monetary Fund 67.
80. Cottarelli (n 79).
81. Tordo (n 33).
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In this sense, the issue for HGs is finding how much economic rent they
can derive from HGIs, while at the same time providing sufficient
incentives for IOCs to invest.82 Moreover, HGs compete internationally
against each other for the investments of IOCs, 83 this being more
challenging for developing countries. 84 Thus, HGs try neither to establish a
fiscal regime that is too burdensome on IOCs, as it would probably lead to
IOCs investing in other countries, nor to offer too generous conditions in
detriment of its public interest.85
It is also important to consider that an effective fiscal regime must
consider and be consistent with actual conditions of the relevant country
(including relevant risks and resources). 86 For example, the Indonesian
government, through its Regulation No 8 of 2017, mandated that for all new
PSCs, a “gross split” mechanism will determine the allocation of
production from petroleum operations between the State and the contractor
without a cost recovery system. 87 In this case, the contractors will be
allocated a potentially higher percentage share of gross production in
exchange for the removal of the cost recovery system. 88
The driver for this fundamental change was primarily the prevailing low
oil price scenario. This meant that in 2016 the Indonesian Government’s
share of oil and gas revenues was reduced by $13.9 billion, which it had
paid for its oil and gas cost recovery obligations, ‘significantly more than
the $12.86 billion in non-tax revenues’89 realized from the oil and gas sector
in the country.90

82. Smith and others (n 1).
83. Tordo (n 33).
84. Tordo (n 33).
85. Tordo (n 33).
86. Smith and others (n 1).
87. “Under a “gross split” PSC, gross production will be allocated between the State,
and the Contractor based solely on production splits, without involving an operational cost
recovery mechanism. On this basis, the contractor’s entitlement to production for each
lifting period, and the resulting revenues will be determined based solely on its gross split
percentage, which is determined on a pre-tax basis.” Ashurst, ‘Indonesia Abandons Cost
Recovery
Mechanism
for
New
Production
Sharing
Contracts’
(2017)
<https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/indonesia-abandons-costrecovery-mechanism/> accessed 10 October 2019.
88. MJ Giranza and A Bergman, ‘Indonesia’s New Gross Split PSC: Is It More
Superior Than the Previous Standard PSC’ (2018) 6 Journal of Economics, Business and
Management.
89. Ashurst (n 87).
90. Ashurst (n 87).
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The new gross split regime represents a significant change in the fiscal
terms of Indonesian PSCs.91 The Regulation demonstrates the willingness
of the Indonesian Government, in a low crude price scenario, to share more
of the downside of lower oil prices in order to encourage continued
investment in Indonesia, during challenging periods in the oil price cycle.
Apparently,
the absence of cost recovery in gross split PSCs will mean that
the State’s entitlement to oil and gas in the early years of
production under a gross split PSC will be higher. As a result,
contractors may need to wait longer to recover their investment
costs under gross split PSCs. This changes the dynamics of a
contractor’s investment and potentially increases their
investment and funding risk. Contractors will likely place
increased emphasis on reserves and production forecasts when
making their investment decisions and may seek to mitigate their
cost exposure where there is more uncertainty in terms of
investment recovery (e.g. when agreeing on firm work
commitments).92
It will be interesting to see if similar changes to the traditional PSC take
place in other jurisdictions as Indonesia was a pioneer HG to adopt and
promote PSC standards for the past decades. These proposed changes could
eliminate the inefficiency or potential corruption in the PSC system because
the cost recovery tends to be a contentious topic for both the Investor and
HGs.93 The investor is not keen to conduct any activity that is not going to
be allowed under the cost recovery system. The HG is keen to reject
anything that is not strictly under the cost recovery system or eventually
removing the wrongful incentives to keep costs high and reduce the said
profit split.94 Nevertheless, it might be challenging to implement such
changes on existing contracts as it would require complicated renegotiations, or it might end up in potential disputes concerning the stability
of the agreements in place.
The choice of fiscal regimes may be divided into two legislation-based
approaches via license-granting or the concession system (both commonly
91. Giranza and Bergman (n 88).
92. Ashurst (n 87).
93. MJ Giranza and A Betrgmann, ‘Indonesia’s New Gross Split PSC: Is It More
Superior Than the Previous Standard PSC?’ (2018) 6 Journal of Economics, Business and
Management.
94. Ibid.
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referred to as a “tax and royalties” system) and those systems that are based
on PSCs and service contracts.95 In the tax and royalties system, the
compensation received by the host government relies mostly on royalties
and/or income taxes on the IOC profits. 96 This is, theoretically, a simpler
system than the contractual system based on PSCs and service contracts,
even though a number of HGIs adopt both systems.97 Nevertheless, some
countries abolished royalties from their fiscal system due to their regressive
nature (e.g. the UK and Norway) and focused on a fiscal system based on
profit.98
The compensation system based on PSCs and service contracts will
depend on whether the chosen HGI is a PSC or a service contract. In the
PSC, the HG receives its share of the production (as profit oil); in the
Service Contracts, the HG receives all revenues less the fees paid to the
IOCs and eventually some costs.99 In both contracts, the IOCs might be
subject to the payment of income tax, even though in some cases, the NOCs
pay such taxes on behalf of the IOCs or the taxes are subject to
reimbursement.100
Regarding the PSC system and some Service Contracts, there is a
discussion over which costs are recoverable and how such costs are
reimbursed. The definition of the recoverable costs (e.g. exploration,
development, production) and any necessary approvals for a cost to be
integrated into the balance to be recovered are crucial for the economic
appraisal of a PSC. Modern PSCs have also established monthly or annual
limitations to the amount of cost oil as a percentage of the total production,
delaying or even hindering the recovery of costs and investments. 101
95. ‘Fiscal Terms for Upstream Projects - An Overview’ Center for Energy Economics,
Bureau of Economic Geology, Jackson School of Geosciences – The University of Texas at
Austin 1 <https://docplayer.net/23918429-Fiscal-terms-for-upstream-projects-an-overview.
html>.
96. Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing
Contracts (n 24).
97. ‘Fiscal Terms for Upstream Projects - An Overview’ (n 93) 1.
98. Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing
Contracts (n 24).
99. .Estudos de Alternativas Regulatórias, Institucionais e Financeiras para a
Exploração e Produção de Petróleo e Gás Natural e para o Desenvolvimento Industrial da
Cadeia Produtiva de Petróleo e Gás Natural no Brasil, available at
www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes_pt/.../
RelConsol-2de6.pdf (accessed on the 10th of October 2019).
100. Smith and others (n 1).
101. PwC, ‘Oil and Gas in Indonesia’ (2014) 74 <https://www.pwc.com/id/en/
publications/assets/oil_and_gas_guide_2014.pdf> accessed 29 September 2019.
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Although the concession system does not offer a direct cost recovery
system it might implement a similar approach with depreciation, tax
allowances and deductions (e.g. Norway) but with higher control to the HG
as regulations might be more easily changed than contractual terms.
There is a possibility for “ring-fencing”, where the host government
limits (or expands) the taxable entities. 102 Usually, cost recovery must be
carried strictly on a field basis – in other words, if the costs are incurred in
one field, they must be recovered from the same field. 103 That being the
case, IOCs with multiple fields cannot derive cost recovery throughout their
different areas.104 Ring-fencing can also apply in relation to taxes and
ensures that income from one project/area cannot be offset against another,
to avoid “opportunistic behaviour” from IOCs. 105 This might also apply if
IOCs have operations in both the upstream and downstream and cannot
offset losses and income from one sector to another. 106 A tax and royalties
regime might be less strict about ring-fencing as it is the case in the UK and
Norway, which may result in tax losses for the HG, but may attract more
investment in mature areas.107
Regarding the Service Contract regime, one may wonder if the service
will be based on ‘risk’ or ‘without risk’ system. In the first case, the RSC
will be reasonably similar to the PSC structure as there should be risk, cost
recovery and a “premium” to the investor in case it manages to find and
develop a field. In the second case, the HG will take full control of
ownership and risks related to the enterprise. Therefore, the investor will
only receive a fee and maybe costs as compensation for their work.

102. Dongkun Luo and Na Yan, ‘Assessment of Fiscal Terms of International Petroleum
Contracts’ (2010) 37 Petroleum exploration and development 756.
103. Kirsten Bindemann, ‘Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis’
(Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 1999).
104. Ibid.
105. Philip Daniel, ‘Fiscal Regimes, Petroleum Contracts, and Natural Gas’, AsiaPacific Natural Resource Taxation Conference in Jakarta (2015) <https://www.imf.
org/external/np/seminars/eng/2015/natrestax/pdf/daniel.pdf> accessed 29 September 2019.
106. Silvana Tordo, Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons: Design Issues (The World Bank
2007).
107. Smith and others (n 7); ‘Norway - Income Tax - KPMG Global’
<https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2011/12/norway-income-tax.html> accessed 29
September 2019.
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Regardless of the different regimes described above, when setting up the
fiscal regime, the host government has to hand a wide variety of tax and
non-tax tools which may be applied to different HGI models, such as:108
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

royalties;
profit oil;
“ring-fencing”;
corporate income tax;
resource rent tax;
windfall tax;
import and export duties;
value-added tax;
bonuses (e.g. exploration or discovery bonuses);
state participation;
environmental taxes;
foreign exchange controls;
performance bonds; and
local content obligations.

Different taxes or obligations have their advantages and disadvantages
for the host governments and may affect positively or negatively the
investment decisions to be taken by IOCs. If the country has significant
proven reserves and a stable government, then it will have stronger leverage
in negotiating fiscal terms and still be able to attract investments. 109
The above basic fiscal concepts are well-understood, but in a modern
context, very flexible, and the old saying “one cannot judge a book by its
cover” frequently applies. 110 For example, some PSCs have a royalty clause
which is common for a concession system. 111 The trend is for countries to
“copy” titles and structure, but “tweak” the economics and other provisions
to suit particular HG needs112.
Consequently, the HG must aim to create a fiscal system which can work
effectively regardless of the price of oil and gas, so that HGIs will not have
108. Tordo (n 106).
109. Sunley. Emil M., Thomas Baunsgaard and Dominique Simard, ‘Revenue from the
Oil and Gas Sector: Issues and Country Experience’, IMF conference on fiscal policy
formulation and implementation in oil producing countries (2002) <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTTPA/Resources/SunleyPaper.pdf> accessed 29 September 2019.
110. Smith and others (n 1).
111. Smith and others (n 1).
112. Tytanic Chris and McDaniel Mark, ‘Host Government Contracts, Types of
Contracts, Fiscal Systems’ (Devon Energy Corporation, 2007) <www.devonenergy.com >
accessed in March 2019.
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to adjust the system each time the reference prices change, thereby creating
more confusion and legal uncertainties and driving investors away. At the
same time, the host government must be able to manage whatever system it
opts for effectively. For example, in a PSC or RSC, the host government
should have human resources available to verify and approve the costs
recovery mechanisms promptly and with careful consideration.113 If they
are not capable of doing so, then delay in reimbursement costs could impact
the project by discouraging IOCs from investing, or might end up
approving costs without proper diligence. 114 Alternatively, the relevant HG
might increase their man-power, in order to gain such capabilities, or even
outsource such tasks, but they should pay attention to the additional cost
involved.
For an IOC, its choice is largely based on achieving its internal rate of
return justifying a particular investment. 115 The IOC will also be interested
in repatriating profits to its shareholders in home countries, whether such a
system leads to a minimum number of front-end loaded non-profit-sensitive
taxes, and if the host government has a transparent, predictable and stable
policy environment, based on the best industry standards and practice. 116 In
addition, the existence of international treaties between the relevant
stakeholders (i.e. investors home country and HG), such as the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT), a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) or a Double
Taxation Treaty (DTT) might encourage foreign investments.
Thus, the differences between a PSC, a concession or service models are
determined by the factors mentioned above. Each HG will attempt to
develop a regime that is attractive to the IOCs, while at the same time
ensuring their share. Nevertheless, this is not always the case as some HGs
end up establishing an aggressive fiscal system (e.g. Libyan production
license rounds under EPSA IV terms end up with 95% of government take
and some companies were bidding for it.) 117
As stated earlier, IOCs might face the most significant disadvantages in
the Service Contracts, where they only receive a fee and/or costs for the
services provided to NOCs or HGs, and are unable to book reserves or
113. Peter D Cameron and Michael C Stanley, Oil, Gas, and Mining - A Sourcebook for
Understanding the Extractive Industries (World Bank Group 2017) 159.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Daniel Johnston, ‘Impressive Libya Licensing Round Contained Tough Terms, No
Surprises’ (2005) 103 Oil & gas journal 29.
117. Johnston, ‘Impressive Libya Licensing Round Contained Tough Terms, No
Surprises’ (n 114).
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receive the production as compensation for the investment made. 118 IOCs
would routinely avoid being in such a position, except, perhaps, for
purposes of fostering a future relationship with the HGs and NOCs, or if the
HGs offer attractive terms for such HGI. 119
After reviewing the risks and the tax system, the IOC will also weigh the
opportunities in the country reviewed against other opportunities available
worldwide, given that any company can only have a limited amount of
investments at the same time. 120 In this sense, creating joint ventures is an
essential tool for IOCs to diversify their risks and portfolio.
It is possible to attune almost any HGI to the desired fiscal system. For
example, a concession arrangement could adopt a “cost recovery system”
through depreciation, allowances and tax exemptions. 121 A concession
system could request royalty in kind or a domestic market obligation to
retain production. 122 An RSC could allow some ownership rights and a
method to book reserves. A profit sharing agreement could remove the cost
recovery system. All systems could have State participation and some direct
or indirect taxation. 123 Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, it might be easier
to implement certain HGIs and to create their intended fiscal structures than
it is others in different legal systems. 124
From the IOC’s perspective, it is essential to mention the opportunity of
being the “first mover” – i.e., the IOCs which receive the first HGIs in any
given country would, in theory, benefit from the terms received upon
discovery of oil and gas as they would take more risks.125 This principle is
based on the idea that any host government will tend to grant HGIs with
less favourable conditions to IOCs as their awareness of the reserves

118. Ghandi and Lin (n 15).
119. Smith and others (n 1).
120. Smith and others (n 1).
121. Bariture Nyoor, Adeogun Oyebimpe and Omowumi O Iledare, ‘The Impact of the
Proposed Petroleum Industry Fiscal Bill PIFB, 2018 Tax Scheme on the Economics of Oil
Production in Nigeria’, SPE Nigeria Annual International Conference and Exhibition
(Society of Petroleum Engineers 2019).
122. Smith and others (n 1).
123. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Violeta Vulovic and Yongzheng Liu, ‘Direct versus
Indirect Taxation: Trends, Theory and Economic Significance’ [2011] The Elgar Guide to
Tax Systems, Edward Elgar Publishing 37.
124. Smith and others (n 1).
125. Sherif Wadood, ‘The Role of Independents in the Oil and Gas Industry’, SPE
Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition (Society of Petroleum Engineers 2006).
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available in their countries increases (i.e. lesser risks in comparison to the
first mover).126
This would represent a disadvantage for a new coming IOC.127 However,
as they would be aware that other IOCs have already made discoveries in a
particular country (thus reducing the exploratory risk) and that they can
operate there (reducing the operational, marketing and infrastructure risks),
the newcomers can assess whether the less favourable terms are in
accordance with their risk evaluation, and make their investment decision
accordingly. 128 Political and legal risks are challenging to mitigate fully;
this is why it is crucial for an investor to understand the stability of the
country awarding the HGI and the implications of a potential direct or
indirect expropriation. 129
Therefore, the form that the fiscal system takes relies on how a HG
wishes to receive compensation in exchange for granting to IOCs the
possibility to explore and produce the oil and gas resources in that
country.130 As we have noted above, there are multiple combinations
possible, and each will have its advantages and disadvantages – including
whether a system is easier to manage but less flexible to adjust according to
the development of the reserves. A theoretically ideal model may be too
complicated to manage, especially for HGs that may have limited human
resources to deal with such complexities. 131
5. The Pursuit of Stability and the Ever-Changing
Host Governmental Agreement
Given the long-term character of oil and gas petroleum agreements, IOCs
are exposed to significant political risks. 132 Throughout the existence of an
HGI, governments, generations, and society change. This may lead to
changes in the existent regulatory framework, the public perception
126. Wadood (n 125).
127. Wadood (n 125).
128. Smith and others (n 1).
129. Mehmet Öğütçü, ‘The Game Changers in World Energy: Geopolitical Implications’
(2013) 12 Turkish Policy Quarterly.
130. Abdulaziz Al‐ Attar and Osamah Alomair, ‘Evaluation of Upstream Petroleum
Agreements and Exploration and Production Costs’ (2005) 29 OPEC review 243.
131. Tordo (n 106).
132. T. HUNTER, REGULATION OF THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LICENSING AND CONCESSION SYSTEMS (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2015),
p. 4. Also: PETER D. CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW, THE PURSUIT OF
STABILITY (Peter D. Cameron ed., Oxford University Press.Oxford, 2010), p. 4.
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regarding the presence of foreign investment or different expectations
regarding the fate or outcome of the HGI itself. 133 At the same time,
advances in technology as well as increased awareness regarding industry
practices risks of pollution, or changes in market prices that affect State
revenues may play a more important part in public policies addressing
environmental concerns and sustainable practices. These are factors with an
adverse impact on the original terms of the HGI and the envisioned
outcomes of the agreement, which might lead certain HGs to request
renegotiations, unilateral amendments of the initial terms or even the
complete repudiation of the HGI by way of expropriation or nationalization.
Therefore, the pursuit of stability remains one of the top priorities 134 of the
petroleum industry engaged in foreign-based operations.
There are several forms of stabilization clauses implemented in HGIs.
Each serves a unique purpose and strikes a certain balance of stability.
Some common versions include:
A freezing clause: This provides that laws applicable to operations
specified in the HGI should be those laws and regulations that were in force
at the time the contract was signed. Simply, it means that the contractors are
guaranteed that they will not be subject to significant changes in governing
legislation and future laws will not affect the HGI.
Typically, freezing clause covers tax policy changes and therefore
profitability of the project for the parties, especially in relation to newly
introduced tax instruments that may adversely affect the financial
circumstances of the parties.
Example: The Contractor shall be subject to the provisions of
this Contract as well as to all laws and regulations duly enacted
by the Granting Authority and which are not incompatible or
conflicting with the Convention and/or this Agreement. It is also
agreed that no new regulations, modifications or interpretation
which could be conflicting or incompatible with the provisions of
this Agreement and/or the Convention shall be applicable. –
1989 Tunisian Model Production Sharing Contract, Article 24.1
An equilibrium clause (also known as “hardship” provision) protects
investors from laws and regulations adopted after the execution of the HGI
by requiring the host government to indemnify the investors from and
against the costs of complying with the new laws and regulations.
133. CAMERON, 2010, p. 4.
134. Id. at 7.
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Depending on the negotiating strength of the investors and the host
government's desire or need for the project and the investors' investment,
these clauses may be full or limited. 135
Example: Where present or future laws or regulations of
Turkmenistan or any requirements imposed on Contractor or its
subcontractors by any Turkmen authorities contain any
provisions not expressly provided for under this Agreement and
the implementation of which adversely affects Contractor’s net
economic benefits hereunder, the Parties shall introduce the
necessary amendments to this Agreement to ensure that
Contractor obtains the economic results anticipated under the
terms and conditions of this Agreement. – 1997 Model
Production Sharing Agreement for Petroleum Exploration and
Production in Turkmenistan
An intangibility clause provides that the HG cannot unilaterally modify
or terminate the HGI. Instead of freezing the law, it simply says that the
laws of the state that would effect the terms of the contract do not apply to
that contract.
Example: The Government of Libya will take all steps necessary
to ensure that the Company enjoys all the rights conferred by
this Concession. The contractual rights expressly created by this
concession shall not be altered except by mutual consent of the
parties. [...]
This Concession shall throughout the period of its validity be
construed in accordance with the Petroleum Law and the
Regulations in force on the date of execution [...]. Any
amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall not affect the
contractual rights of the Company without its consent. – From
Concession agreements Texaco signed with Libya Between 1955
and 1966.
The ‘Hybrid’ clause includes both freezing clause and intangibility
clause. Its aim is to protect parties against destabilization and unilateral

135. Economic Equilibrium Clause (Thomson Reuters Practical Law TM) <
https://is.gd/pH4mj4> accessed 25 November 2019.
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actions.136 With these common forms and examples in mind we will dive
into a deeper analysis of stability clause implementation.
5.1. The Usual Suspect – The Host Government
Generally, host States are presented and perceived as the main culprit 137
in the amendment of HGI motivated by their insatiable greed. 138 Peter
Cameron states that the long-term stability of concessions is affected by
two aspects. On the one hand, is an opportunistic behaviour of the state that
will constantly attempt to reduce the value of the project. 139 On the other
hand, are the HG’s attempts to capitalize on gains determined by sudden
shifts in market behaviour (e.g. a significant increase of prices, which lead
to significant gains for the company, but not for the state). 140 Cameron
argues such behaviour generates a lack of trust from the investors' side and
creates periodic instability, which justifies the investors' pursuit of stability.
As tools for changes caused by host States, Cameron refers to "a
combination of regulatory and negotiation"141 and "nationalization."142
However, the aforementioned might not be a holistic perception of this
matter. Host States are also interested in stable long-term relationships just
as much as investors and can suffer when investors engage in unsustainable
maximization of profit, opportunistic behaviour,143 or when economic

136. Mario Mansour & Dr Carole Nakhle. ‘Fiscal Stabilization in Oil and Gas Contracts:
Evidence and Implications’ (2016) Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
137. There are authors referring to default and certain expropriations as 'sovereign theft',
suggesting that states' behavior are even criminal in nature. Virginia Haufler, The Natural
Resources Trap: Private Investment without Public Commitment – Edited by William Hogan
and Federico Sturzenegger § 29 (Malden, USA, 2012), p. 69. However, expropriation itself
could be performed in accordance with the relevant jurisdiction and international laws as
well.
138. "The driver behind the increase in taxes is the perceived failure of the existing terms
to generate a higher share of the additional revenue for the government." CAMERON, 2010, p.
10.
139. Id. at 5. Also: Haufler, 2012, p. 52.
140. On the likeliness of renegotiations regarding profitable wells - Haufler, 2012, p. 58.
141. CAMERON, 2010, pp. 8-10.
142. Id. at 10-13.
143. Both parties of an oil and gas concession stand to profit when a commercial
discovery is exploited. However, many companies engage in exploration operations only to
diversify their resource pool and are not interested in commercial exploitation right away.
Market prices may also act as a deterrent to commercial exploitation. However, such
business decisions affect the state revenues and expectation for return from the discovery
made.
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situations144 disrupts the functioning of the petroleum agreement. The
potential insolvency or economic hardship of the concessionaire/contractor
may lead to suspension or cessation of operations and to possible retenders,
which is detrimental to both states and their citizens. Renegotiations and
requests for an increase of state support might happen whenever they are
“deemed necessary” to maintain the viability of a project (at least from one
party perspective), which indicates that flexibility is necessary for ensuring
the proper functioning of a long-term agreement.145
However, although co-interested in the stability of the agreement, States
might enjoy less rights and possibilities to enforce it in certain instances
(especially if the HG agrees to such conditions). The most blatant example
is the fact that under the ECT, States cannot directly bring a claim against
the investors for breach of the latter's obligations. 146 This right is reserved
solely to investors.
At the same time, Cameron's point of view appears to be contradicted by
the very data offered to support it. As Cameron puts it, "a higher state share
of revenue […] has occasionally, been agreed with investors, in exchange
for extensions to existing contract periods. These negotiations can be
instigated by either government or company"147 (emphasis added). The
wording is telling and nuances the overall image of the rapacious host state
and so does empirical data. Host States face risks as well. During the
financial crisis or during periods of massive drops in prices, investors faced
default or even bankruptcy. 148 In many of these cases, it was the IOC that
sought a new agreement with a State. History recorded instances when
IOCs amended unilaterally their own rules, thus affecting the outcome of

144. Where concession holders fail to recoup investment or to make a profit on the
investment due to market conditions, they usually push for changes in the concession's terms
– modification of revenues, taxes, prices, etc, thus asking for state's support. The alternative
is a disruption in provided services, which would require a retender and a replacement of
concessionaire, which is not in the interest of the state or of the stakeholders. As such
renegotiations are often a "necessary evil" in ensuring the continuation of the economic
viability of a project. Nicholas Miranda, Concession Agreements: From Private Contract to
Public Policy, 117 THE YALE LAW J OURNAL (2007), pp 525-526.
145. Haufler, 2012, p. 58.
146. Art 26 of the ECT, available online at http://www.energycharter.org/
fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf, last visited 02.06.2017. Art 26 of ECT
speaks only of the possibility of the Investor to submit a dispute for resolution, without
allowing the Contracting Party to submit a dispute for resolution against the Investor.
147. CAMERON, 2010, p. 8.
148. Id. at 50.
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the concession in what regards the rights of the host State. 149 Finally, the
data points out that rarely have there been situations where the HG sought
and obtained a modification of a HGI, without giving something in return.
Cameron compiles a table with countries that amended their fiscal terms
during 2002-2008 containing only those whose changes were deemed
detrimental to investor's economic interests. The table reveals that most
developed and democratic countries resort to same tactics employed by
developing, high risk ones. Hence, next to States such as Argentina,
Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, or Venezuela, one finds Canada (Alberta and
Newfoundland), the US (Alaska), the UK, Italy and Australia.150
Although he presents it as a significant risk, Cameron also nuances the
practical effects of nationalization: "although much of the political rhetoric
refers to nationalization, the outcome is more of a result of new
negotiations, with many investors remaining in the country."151 Our
analysis reveals that Iran is the only country that unilaterally annulled a
concession and immediately negotiated another (1933) and threatened
nationalization (1951) in order to obtain more favourable terms. Otherwise,
Middle Eastern countries resorted to concerted nationalizations only in
1970's, when the decision had more to do with the geopolitical climate, than
with pure economic interests. Our data confirms that where HGs perceive
that contractual benefits are satisfactory (economic balance), the
relationship with the IOC is stable.
Otherwise, empirical evidence suggests that a high level of volatility is
among the characteristics of HGI, notwithstanding the name of the HG. As
time passes and governments' experience improves, peoples' expectations
change, concession agreements change as well. The only thing that differs
is the method. Hence, stability is in fact temporary, everywhere around the
globe. As data suggests, in most of the developed countries, total stability in
long term contracts is outright rejected (Norway, the UK, or the US). It
plays more of a preventive or deterrent role than it is an achievement. Two
questions arise. Is it possible to speak of stability in the context of HGIs?
Should there even be stability in HGIs? If one considers the wording of
bilateral investment treaties or of multilateral treaties such as the ECT, the
149. This is notable in historic concessions in the middle east where at the time of
granting, the granting sovereign had little authority with less sophisticated laws and
generally a lack of any laws addressing petroleum operations nor any government controls
or capabilities. Smith, From Concessions to Services Contracts, 5 Tulsa Law Review, Vol.
27 [1991], Iss. 4, Art. 3.
150. Id. at 10-11.
151. Id. at 12.
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answer appears to be affirmative. However, the practical reality presents
itself to be different.
5.2. Are Petroleum Agreements Stable?
Given the lack of experience of certain government negotiators and the
might of the companies seeking concession, the terms offered were grossly
unfair at the beginning of the 20th century. 152 As knowledge and bargaining
power of HGs increased, the initial terms of the concessions have been
subsequently amended on numerous occasions. In fact, history indicates
that traditional concessions were a continuous renegotiation process, parties
seeking either more equitable terms or to maintain their acquired rights. The
history of petroleum agreements and regulation in developed countries does
not seem to differ. Developed countries' governments' behaviour is similar
to that of the Middle Eastern States that lacked both legislation and
experience in dealing with oil and gas investors in the past.
There is a significant amount of literature about attempts to make longterm contracts in the oil and gas sector more stable. The reason the topic
generates so much interest is that despite all efforts, HGIs cannot sit still.
However, while everyone seems to notice the problem and propose
solutions, very few focus on the inherent volatile nature of long-term
agreements. At the same time, very little attention is given to the double
standard applicable to different categories of States. For instance, following
a classification of UNCTAD, Cameron distinguishes between transitional
economies (CEE, Central Asia, and Balkan States) and developed countries
(so called market states, such as Western Europe and the US), although, as
it will be shown, empirical evidence seems to contradict the idea that HGIs
are more stable in developed countries.
5.2.2. A Double Standard?
While there might be systemic differences between them, one cannot
overlook the fact that "a significant number of HGs around the world do not
offer a specific stabilization clause or any contract-based equivalent"153 or,
the more striking observation, that "this is the default situation among
market states."154 In other words, the same developed States making an

153. CAMERON, 2010, p 15.
154. Id. at 15-16. "Governments in the market states reject pleas for fiscal stability on the
grounds that they cannot bind a future government to policies of the current administration
since this would infringe sovereign rights and is almost certainly impossible in the context of
their domestic legal traditions." (p. 16). See also footnote 18 where it is mentioned that "to
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issue of stability in transitional countries do not see any problem with the
lack of stability within their own borders. 155
One explanation for the obvious double standard lies in the "historical
and cultural context", meaning that "in a number of developing or
transitional states, the Rule of Law is either not firmly entrenched or does
not operate in the way an investor from a market state would expect."156 As
much as one would like to indulge this possible Western superiority
complex, it makes no difference, for the loss caused by unilateral change is
pecuniary, notwithstanding location. Developed States are simply more able
to impose their will than developing ones. The best evidence is that despite
high political risk, and the numerous changes or amendments in the Middle
East concessions, foreign investors remained in the area simply because
there was (still) a lot of profit to make.
Two other, rather unconvincing, explanations concern: 1) the developing
countries' dependency on the revenues generated by their oil and gas
reserves and 2) the developed States' dependency on oil and gas imports.
The former allegedly makes them more prone to change and opportunistic
behaviour, but does not explain why the developed States, with diverse
sources of revenue, behave in the same way. The latter makes stability a top
priority for developed countries, however, does not explain why these
States' governments do not offer stable long-term deals to investors within
their own borders. At the same time, it fails to consider the disruptions in
service provision or revenue collection, like those cause by the Iranian
nationalization of 1951.
5.3. Topical Analysis
In this section we use a matrix of analysis in order to support with
empirical evidence the fact that although an important aspect in
negotiations and discourse regarding petroleum agreements, stabilization
remains more of a myth, notwithstanding the type of HGI in place. In this
regard we use both historical concessions in the Middle East – representing
developing States – and the modern type of concession (license regimes) –
representing developed Western countries.

encourage compliance with its policies, the market state is able to use its discretionary
powers over license allocation."
155. On the myth of stability in the US see: Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investorstate contracts, host-state, commitments, and the myth of stability in international law, 24
AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2013)
156. CAMERON, 2010, p. 17.
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A matrix of analysis regarding concession agreements is a challenging
task, for several reasons. Primarily, there is no tested matrix yet. Secondly,
there are significant idiosyncratic differences between the chosen groups of
countries. When historical concessions were introduced in the Middle East,
there was neither petroleum, nor tax legislation in place. The legal
framework governing operations was limited to the concession agreement
itself. These agreements were of obviously contractual nature, which might
explain the constant process of renegotiation employed to redefine the
relationship. Absent or underdeveloped regulation in the host countries
together with the lack of balance between the benefits obtained by the
parties involved may have been the causes for the lack of stability. As
Middle Eastern governments learned the rules of the game and started
developing a legal framework, the changes were bound to affect the
existing concessions, with unforeseen results. Western jurisdictions appear
to have taken the opposite route, by designing a legal framework and only
afterwards entering concession agreements or granting licenses for
operations. This might explain the apparent stability of the regime and of
the concessions in place. However, evidence suggests that regulatory
changes affected existing (granted) concessions (licenses), which means
that both groups share comparable similarities. Therefore, the proposed
matrix goes beyond systemic differences. Thirdly, mechanical descriptions
of either agreements or legislations in place would not offer viable answers,
and focus must be maintained on policy considerations and aims.
We identified six topics for the analysis of HGI from the perspective of
stabilization. These topics are: (1) amendments of the governing legal
framework (by renegotiation or legislator intervention); (2) amendments of
the tax or fiscal regime; (3) unilateral changes or termination; (4)
nationalization; (5) State participation; and (6) reduction of concession's
area.
It must be stated here that the article is not of the opinion that an analysis
based on these common elements will automatically answer or solve all
dilemmas regarding the issue of stabilization. Other circumstances still need
to be considered, such as: a) the actual wording of contracts or licenses, b)
the existence of regulatory bodies and the powers granted to them, c)
constitutional considerations, treaties entered and ratified, memberships in
international organizations, d) regulatory capture, and e) the incidence of
corruption. However, they do offer answers with respect to fundamental
concerns of parties involved in HGI and reveal that, despite systemic
differences, their aims are fundamentally the same and addressed in similar
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manners. As such, the analysis shows that the issue of stabilization
transcends legal systems and remains largely unattainable.

Country

Iran

Iraq

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

Denmark

Norway

The UK

Type of HGI

Concession

Concession

Concession

Concession

Concession
(License)

License

License

State Participation

No157

No158

No

No

Yes

Yes159

Yes*

Renegotiation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

157. The Persian Government was denied participation in the D'Arcy Concession both in
management and in equity. MIKDASHI, 196634
158. The Iraqi Government requested native participation from the first concession
granted in 1925. However, the foreign companies opposed it and Iraq held no equity until
the 1970s nationalizations
159. Petroleum operations were only possible based on a concession issued by the state,
with the state company (Statoil) getting a share in each of them. HUNTER, 2015, pp. 144-145
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160. The D'Arcy Concession was unilaterally canceled in 1932 and replaced by a new
concession agreement in 1933. However, both parties appear to have wanted a new
agreement and there was no punitive action. The sole truly unilateral move made by the
Iranians, was the nationalization of 1951, which is addressed separately.
161. Following failed negotiations regarding the relinquishment of concession areas, in
1961 the Iraqi government passed a law by which it reduced the concessionaire's acreage to
the fields operated at that moment. Hence, via law, the government unilaterally modified the
terms of the concession agreement, reducing the concession area from 16,000 square miles
to 740 square miles only (a reduction of 99.5%). MIKDASHI, 1966, p. 208.
162. The decision of the Saudi government to enter into an agreement with Onassis to
create a national tanker company, in order to increase its revenues from oil exports, may be
considered an attempt to unilaterally amend the terms of the 1933 concession agreement.
The deal, concluded in 1954, was disputed by the company, which alleged a breach of the
1933 concession that gave them the right to use their own transport, thus severely cutting the
possibility of Saudi oil exports. The dispute was referred to arbitration and, in 1963, the
tribunal held that the Onassis deal violated the concession agreement and emphasized that
the 'stabilization clause' was binding on the host state https://www.trans-lex.org/260800/
_/aramco-award-ilr-1963-at-117-et-seq/, page 197, last visited on 23.05.2017.). Saudi's
compliance with the arbitral award meant that the attempt to unilaterally amend the
concession agreement's terms and regain their legislative sovereignty had suffered a bitter
defeat, despite an obvious national interest thereof.
163. In 1980 Denmark invited concessionaires to negotiations, based on the aggravated
energy situation, requiring among others an increase in exploration operations, a
relinquishment of 50% of all areas by 1982 and relinquishment of all non-producing areas by
1985 as well as the right to purchase 50% of the produced oil at preferential discounted
prices. Since no agreement could be reached, the government's proposal was submitted to
the Parliament to be turned into law, which basically resulted in expropriation. T. DAINTITH,
THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENCES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (University of
Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Studies, 1981), ADDENDUM (following p.
175).
164. In 1975, the legislative decided to amend all licenses' terms by new legislation.
165. As history has it, D'Arcy would have wanted to pay revenues of only 10% but in the
end 16% was accepted as a "quid pro quo for complete fiscal exemption" (MIKDASHI, 1966,
pp. 12-14). The Persian government became unsatisfied with the unclear and arbitrary
amounts it received as a result of the concession (there is evidence of significant deliberate
royalty evasion and lack of transparency and unfair practices in accounting), which led to a
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renegotiation and the adoption of an "interpretative agreement" in 1920, establishing a new
method of computing the government's revenues that further depleted the government's
earnings (id. at 35-39). Merely a decade later, in an attempt to raise its receipts from the
exploitation of its natural resources, Persia enacted an income tax law to which the
concessionaire refused to submit (id. at 40). In 1933, a new concession agreement was
signed with APOC which linked royalties to tonnage giving also the Persian government a
share in the company's dividends. Additional financial terms ensured a minimum annual
payment of 750,000 GBP (id. at 77). After the short-lived nationalization of 1951, Iran
entered into a new concession agreement with a Consortium of companies in 1954. The new
concession provided the Iranian government with a bigger share of the profits – 60% instead
of 50%, stemming from the fact that large portions of the exported oil went to non-affiliates,
at significant discounts, which were not eligible for tax deductions. However, although the
Consortium endeavored to observe the agreement, the government and the national oil
company still had their grievances, regarding an increase in volume of production, profit
margins of refineries or the unilateral modification of the posted price by the Consortium,
having adverse effects on their income. Id. at 223-224.
166. The 1925 concession agreement contained a complete fiscal exemption (id. at 67).
However, the Iraqi government seemed to have been more aware than their Persian
counterparts in 1901, for they wanted royalties to be based on a sliding scale, varying
directly with the company’s profits and included from the outset a provision stating that
changes in royalty rates were to be made once every ten years (id. at 68). In 1931 there were
already disputes regarding the payment of royalties, due to British renunciation of the gold
standard and depreciation of the GBP. Negotiations were resumed in 1949 due to the
devaluation of the GBP which led to another amendment of the agreement in 1950. Only
four months later, the 50-50 method of payment was introduced in Saudi Arabia, which
immediately determined the Iraqi government to solicit and obtain a similar treatment in
1952 (id. at 152). In 1957 Iraq started disputing the amortization costs and deductible
expenses of the company, which diminished the profits and the government's share. An
agreement thereof was reached in 1961 (id. at 199). At the same time the government tried to
renegotiate the overall financial terms based on a provision of the 1952 agreement, however,
in 1962 the company refused to amend them stating that the circumstances mentioned in the
agreement were not met. Id. at 205.
167. The concession's financial terms were amended in 1951, after several years of
negotiations. Additional payments were introduced in the same year as a result of the Kuwait
Income Tax Regulations (id. at , p. 153). A subsequent amendment occurred in 1955, given
that both US and British tax departments disputed the income tax imposed by the Kuwait
government. As a result, a gradual income tax was introduced and applied on all companies
making business in Kuwait (id. at 216). Nonetheless, Kuwait received also a 25 million GBP
as a price for the amendment. 1955 was also the year when the discounts on posted prices
started being reduced, with two follow ups in 1961 and 1964. Id. at 216.
168. Disputes concerning method of payment occurred in Saudi Arabia in 1948, when an
agreement was entered settling at the dollar price of a gold sovereign for situations where the
US and Saudi prices were divergent id. at 121). Delays caused by the war led to an extension
of 6 year of the initial term, while the company also obtained a 2 year 10% discount on
payments made in dollars (id. at 121). Financial negotiations were resumed in late 1940s as
Saudi Arabia challenged the right of the US government to tax profits arising from the
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exploitation of Saudi natural resources and attempted to amend the financial terms of the
1933 concession. In 1950, a retroactive agreement was reached. Moreover, the Saudis
introduced an income tax law and managed to impose a "supplementary tax" ensuring that
payments to the government reached 50% of the net operating revenue of the company (id.
at 148-149. Also: BERNARD TAVERNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATION OF THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: LAWS, CONTRACTS, AND CONVENTIONS (Graham & Trotman, 1994),
p. 42). In return, the company gained several monetary advantages (MIKDASHI, 1966, p.
150). Just one year later, the Saudi government raised the question of applicability of foreign
tax to its share of the profits. As a result, in 1952 the 1950 agreement was revised to provide
for a split of profits before payment of US taxes (id. at 150). Soon after, disputes regarding
discounts in price offered to company affiliates, resulted in a settlement of 70 million USD
(id. at 186). Since the government still felt it does not have a say in determining deductible
expenses for income tax calculations, a new agreement was signed in 1963, giving the right
to the government to refuse deductions. Id. at 185.
169. The UK's take on petroleum operations is a combination of licensing fees, area
rental fees and various taxes, including corporation tax, supplementary charge to corporation
tax and, for fields developed before 1993 a petroleum revenue tax. The alleged purpose is
maximizing the state's income without affecting ongoing investments in mature areas or
frontier areas. The corporation tax is currently at 30%, while the supplementary charge that
tried to capture excess profit during a period of high prices was initially set at 10% but
reached 32% in 2011. Another review of oil and gas fiscal terms was scheduled for 2015.
The often increases were perceived as nothing more than blatant "cash grabs" by a
government struggling with the effects of the financial crisis. HUNTER, 2015, p. 117. Yet,
there is no evidence of legal challenge or lack of compliance with the state's opportunistic
behavior.
170. In 1948, Iran renegotiated the 1933 concession financial terms, which resulted in the
1950 "supplemental agreement" that preserved the basic method of calculation, but raised
the rates. However, the Parliament refused to ratify the agreement. As news of better terms
offered to neighboring countries emerged, Iran started discussing the potential
nationalization of the oil industry. In reply, the concession holder offered to negotiate a new
agreement regarding the equal division of production profits. It was too late. In 1951, the
Parliament voted for nationalization. MIKDASHI, 1966, pp.154-155.
171. The initial concession covered an area of 500,000 square miles (almost 4/5 of Persia'
territory). In 1933, upon signing of the new concession, Iran sought and obtained a reduction
of the concession area to 100,000 square miles, at the company's choice.
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* UK state participation decreased in the recent years and the state does not partake
anymore in HGI.
** A stabilization clause was negotiated and inserted in the extension of the
concession granted to Moller, however this did not preclude the Danish state from
amending its tax system.

172. The initial surface was of 196 square miles, but a first renegotiation in 1929
extended it to an exclusive area of 35,125 square miles (MIKDASHI, 1966, p. 71.). Another
75 years concession was granted to an independent oil group in 1932 over an area of 41,302
square miles on far more favorable terms to the Iraqi government. Notwithstanding the
governmental attempt to encourage competition, Iraq Petroleum Company managed to
secure control over the new concession in 1937 and in 1938, via another associate, gained an
additional 75 years concession over another 87,236 square miles, thus covering the entirety
of the country (id. at 73. Also: TAVERNE, 1994, p. 34.). Subsequent negotiations ensued in
1961 regarding the relinquishment of vast concession areas. The company offered to
relinquish 75% of the area at one and a further 15% over the next 7 years, an offer that was
rejected by the Iraqis and led to a suspension of both negotiations and drilling operations. As
a result, the Iraqi government then passed a law restricting the concession area of IPC to the
fields operated at that moment.
173. In the 1948 agreement it was stated that by 1960 Aramco will relinquish 140,413
square miles in the exclusive area and 135,200 square miles in the preferential area (. In
1950, the company agreed to a complete relinquishment of its preferential area and a gradual
relinquishment of its exclusive area that was reduced to 105,000 square miles. MIKDASHI,
1966, p. 193.
174. In 1976, the parties of the Danish sole concession reached an agreement by which,
among others, a schedule for gradual relinquishment of areas was established and state
interests in building a pipeline was acknowledged. Only 3 years later, the Danish
government was asking the concessionaires to agree on a much faster program of
relinquishment. In 1980, it invited the concessionaires to new (and specific) negotiations,
based on the aggravated energy situation, requiring among others an increase in exploration
operations, a relinquishment of 50% of all areas by 1982 and relinquishment of all nonproducing areas by 1985 as well as the right to purchase 50% of the produced oil at
preferential discounted prices. Since no agreement could be reached, the government's
proposal was submitted to the Parliament to be turned into law, which would have resulted
in expropriation. Because of governmental pressures the agreement was modified in 1981 in
a radical manner so that by 1986 the concessionaires relinquished all their Danish territories
and retained only their North Sea producing fields. Out of these, 25% were relinquished in
2000 and 25% were relinquished in 2005. DAINTITH, 1981, p. 173 and the following.
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The topical analysis proves that despite systemic differences, aims and
policies of host States do not differ. Legal and contractual principles do not
stand in the way of parties seeking out better terms on their agreement.
Despite their terms and governing principles, HGIs appear to be more
volatile than stable.
Historical concession agreements concluded in the Middle East were
characterized by (very) long-term duration and high level of volatility. The
contracting relationship has been a continuous renegotiation during which
the conflicting interests of the parties involved sought a better balance and a
(more) equitable distribution of wealth generated by the exploitation of the
host state's natural resources. The political risk was deemed high, however,
so were the returns of the oil and gas industry active in the area. HGs also
benefitted. As time went by, it was also observed a development in the
attitude of the government, seeking less income in a short period of time
and trying to answer more the aspiration of the population as major
stakeholders.175
It should not be inferred from the aforementioned examples that the
constant negotiation and amendment of terms is only provoked by the HG
who are not interested in stable business relationships. Evidence shows that
in many occasions the companies themselves asked for changes in terms. At
the same time, governments do not usually gain from volatility, for their
main objective remains to insure a stable revenue source to their budgets. 176
Iran's loss of revenues due to the unilateral cancellation of the concession
makes a perfect example.
The volatility of the concession agreements is linked with the everchanging circumstances of the global oil market, the volatility of the price,
changes in companies' business policies or practices, importing states' laws,
competition with other host countries, desire to gain control over a 'public
service' or 'national security' aspects, wide spread of information and
standardization of terms, and experience in negotiation. The wide number
of factors influencing the existing agreements, combined with their longterm duration simply does not add up to stability. The answer to the
question whether concession agreements should be stable at all is addressed
in the conclusion.

175. MIKDASHI, 1966, p. 237.
176. Id. at 239. Data indicates that as long as the oil prices remained at a convenient level
or increased, states were satisfied with their revenues and the computing methods used to
calculate their share. The reverse caused an opposite reaction and led to new negotiations.
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6. Discussion
HGIs contain different levels of control and rights in the Upstream
sector. Due to recent developments in the sector, certain hybrids and
crossbreeds have been created where a mixture of a concession/license is
present in a PSC or vice-versa or in an RSC. 177 There is much proof of this
in the model contracts developed by both international organisations and
various national governments. 178
Table 1: Comparison of Concession, PSC and Service Contract Terms

Elements

Concession

Production
Sharing
Contracts
(PSC)

Services Contracts
Pure Service

Risk Service

Risk

The investor
takes all
financial and
technical risks.

All financial
and technical
risks are taken
by the investor.
Usually applied
in high-risk
areas with
limited
hydrocarbon
developments.

All financial and
technical risks are
taken by HG.
It is usually
granted in a lowrisk area with the
high potential of
hydrocarbon
resources.

The investor
takes all financial
and technical
risks.
Usually applied
in high-risk areas
with limited
hydrocarbon
developments.

Control

The HG tends
to have limited
control in the
management
over petroleum
operations.

The HG tends to
have higher
control in the
management
over petroleum
operations.

The HG tends to
have total control
in the management
over petroleum
operations.

The HG tends to
have total control
in the
management over
petroleum
operations.

The HG tend
to own all the
reserves in the
country.

The HG owns
all the reserves
in the country.

The HG owns all
the reserves and
production in the
country.

The HG owns all
the reserves and
production in the
country.

Ownership

177. Tade Oyewunmi, ‘Natural Gas Exploration and Production in Nigeria and
Mozambique: Legal and Contractual Issues’ [2015] OGEL 1 (2015).
178. Oyewunmi (n 177).
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Contractor
tends to own
all production.

The contractor
usually receives
its share from
the production.

The contractor has
no rights over the
discovered and
produced oil
and/or gas
resources.

The contractor
has no right over
the discovered
and produced oil
and gas
resources.

Marketing

Each party is
free to do their
marketing of
the oil/gas
produced.
However, in
some
jurisdictions,
royalties can
be paid in kind
and/or
domestic
market
obligations can
be secured at
an agreed
price.

Each party is
free to do their
marketing of the
oil/gas
produced.
However, in
some
jurisdictions,
domestic market
obligations can
be secured at
the agreed price.

Marketing of the
oil/gas produced
under the control
of HG.

Marketing of the
oil/gas produced
under the control
of HG.

Fiscal
System

HG collected
rents, royalty
and /or taxes.
HG usually
does not
participate or
support in any
cost recovery
system even
though some
countries
could provide
tax exemptions
and
depreciation
procedures
similar to the
cost recovery
system.

Production
Split

The contractor
receives agreed
percentage of
the production
to cover its
costs and the
remaining of the
production
distributed
between the HG
and the
contractor.
Tax may be
settled by NOC
on behalf of the
contractor or
should be paid
separately to the
HG.
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HG pays the
contractor agreed
amount for the
work.
Tax may be settled
by NOC on behalf
of the contractor or
should be paid
separately to the
HG.

The contractor
receives the
agreed fees and
costs of the
production. The
remaining of the
production goes
to the HG.
Tax may be
settled by NOC
on behalf of the
contractor or
should be paid
separately to the
HG.
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6.1. Does it matter what type of HGI the HG offer? Why and for whom?
It is not straightforward to determine which HGI is the most beneficial.
In reality, it is not possible to say that one HGI is better than another, but it
may be possible to find the most suitable HGI to suit the expectations of the
particular country in which the exploration and production is to take
place.179 The political situation of each country will undoubtedly influence
the type of HGI chosen, both to provide the best protection for the national
interest, and attract investors as a result of past experiences or the history of
upstream sector in that particular country. 180
In this sense, it is possible to suggest that perception and reputation are
relevant for any upstream investment as well as for any HG consideration
before creating or modifying its legal system. For example, concessions do
not possess a “positive” connotation in developing countries due to past
connections with the colonial period and highly unfavourable terms towards
the HG. More recently, Mexico changed its constitution (after a long period
of State monopoly and restrictions against sharing oil and gas resources)
and allowed other HGIs to be awarded apart from the service contract
(including licenses and PSCs), but still does not allow a concession
agreement as a clear sign against the term “concession”. A contract-based
system is also more likely to be used in a jurisdiction without a highly
developed legal system where there might be a perceived necessity to
provide further details in a contract.
It is possible to suggest that PSCs are more common in countries where
the industry has been profoundly affected by the political situation and
higher geological and financial risks (i.e. Africa and Asia).181 In these cases,
PSCs ensure that the HGs maintain closer control of its resources and
participates entirely or at least significantly in the oil and gas industry. HG
in developed economies are not heavily dependent on oil and gas activities,
and the private sector tends to determine most of these activities, based on
the following of specific rules (minimum work program, HSE, etc.) with
some exceptions in the European Nordic region with higher and direct
governmental intervention in the upstream sector.182 This soft governmental
approach is favoured by the concession or license regime while Service
179. Smith and others (n 1).
180. Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An
Introduction (Greenwood Publishing Group 2005) 18.
181. Raymond F Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations and Agreements in the
Developing Countries. (Routledge, London 1984).
182. Terence Daintith, ‘Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and Gas -A
Comparative Study’ [2006] OGEL.
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Contracts take a more conservative approach as the HG takes complete
control of upstream activities and permits the private sector minor
participation (e.g. the Middle East).183
The most critical element of these HGIs is that the parties involved
receive precisely what is intended from the agreement and that all terms and
conditions are met. 184This is crucial because the nature of conflicting
interests and objectives of major parties in the HGIs means that it is
necessary to create a perfect balance between such discrepancies in order to
achieve a successful agreement for upstream activities.
6.2. Flexibility
A far better deal can be drawn up based on the understanding of either
party’s wants or needs. The already cyclical nature of the oil and gas
industry will continue to be affected by privatisation and nationalisation of
resources, market liberalisation and global and regional geopolitics. 185
Creating a balance between risk and reward will be an essential element in
successful business ventures in the future, and an understanding of the everchanging nature of this industry will go a long way to helping establish this
balance.186
Despite the difference between the details included in the contracts it is
important to establish two key issues: 1) the division of profit between the
government and IOCs, and 2) how resources are to be controlled. In certain
circumstances, negotiations become incredibly complicated when there are
high levels of uncertainty arising from the high-risk nature of the business
as well as a lack of information. 187 Typically, neither party in the agreement
can predict, when signing the contract, the exact costs involved in the total
exploration of a contract and the development of a field; how much oil or
gas exists in the field; or whether future oil or gas prices will justify the
expenditure. 188 The average rate of success is not high. Exploration efforts
on nine out of ten concessions result in a loss.

183. Smith and others (n 1).
184. Daintith (n 182).
185. Roberto Chang, Constantino Hevia and Norman Loayza, Privatization and
Nationalization Cycles (The World Bank 2009).
186. Chang, Hevia and Loayza (n 180).
187. Gamal Abou-elkhair, ‘Oil & Gas Contracts ’ Risks Negotiation in the Climate of
Economic Recession’, Society of Petroleum Engineer (2015).
188. Abou-elkhair (n 182).
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There is significant pressure on the HG to negotiate and manage
agreements in order to produce the “best” possible contract. 189 There is also
pressure upon society as a whole, parliamentarians and the media to hold
accountable both governments and investors. The complex nature of
contracts drawn up for large natural resource investments raises challenges
for those negotiating, implementing and reviewing contracts.190 There is
increasing importance given to issues revolving around Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), sustainability and environmental protection. 191
This is why HGI should be designed in a way that provides flexibility in
order to absorb these challenging circumstances, higher expectations from a
variety of different stakeholders and uncertainties involving the upstream
sector. As shown in Section 5, empirical evidence clearly suggests that
flexibility, rather than stability, is one of the common denominators of all
HGIs throughout history.
6.3. Will there be a carried interest?
Carried Interest is a sole risk scenario where the party or parties with
working interest agree to bear the costs of another working interest. The
carried party will have to pay those costs and generally will have to pay
some risk premium to the carrying party if production comes out of that
carrying event. This is commonly seen in Joint operating agreements in
nonconsent operations.
In the HGI context carried interest depends on the regime set up by the
HG and its goals. It is quite common to see the NOC be carried by the IOC
when NOC participation is necessary.192 For example, regardless of the
HGI type, the HG law may require that the IOC pay all of the exploration
and development costs of the granted area. In return the IOC will be able to
deduct those costs from the production or revenue earned once commercial
production begins. Depending on commercial factors, this may be a risk
that the IOC is willing to take. 193
Generally speaking, a historical concession agreement (i.e one that does
not involve an NOC) does not bring up carried interest issues with regards
189. Talus, Looper and Otillar (n 2).
190. Ingilab Ahmadov and others, ‘How to Scrutinize a Production Sharing Agreement’
[2012] London: IIED.
191. Peter Roberts, Joint Operating Agreements: A Practical Guide (Globe Law and
Business, London 2010) 226.
192. C harlotte J. Wright, Rebecca A. Gallun, 142 International Petroleum Accounting,
(PennWell Books, 2005).
193. Id.
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to the overarching HGI since the government is not working the field or pay
for its share when it does (i.e. Norway and Brazil). However, there are
HGIs that bear the name concession that one should be mindful of carrying
interest (i.e. Morocco). Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) will quite
often contain a carrying provision since governments generally require that
the NOC be involved in this type of development scheme and less “mature”
NOCs might not be able to pay for its bills (e.g. Kenya and Mozambique).
Lastly, what about carried interests in service contracts? In the standard
service contract, there is not a carried interest issue. The IOC does the work
and is paid with oil or currency for performing its contractual duties.
However, in a risk service contract, the IOC agrees to take carry the costs
and later recover those costs in oil or currency depending on the agreement
struck.194
6.4. Confidentiality and Transparency
From the above it follows that when deciding which HGI to select it is
important to have an awareness of the significant need for confidentiality
involved in awarding such contracts, as well as an excellent working
knowledge of the terms included in the contract, with particular attention
paid to the fiscal element.195 The high level of confidentiality and, therefore,
the apparent lack of transparency surrounding these contracts has become
the center of some heated political debates, which include politicians, and
members of society. 196 The lack of transparency could potentially act as a
cover-up for corruption, which may exist under such levels of
confidentiality or secrecy.197
It is necessary for oil and gas contracts, subcontracts and regulations to
become completely transparent and made public if claims of corruption and
foul play are to be disproved. 198 This is a difficult task for these contracts
are traditionally extremely complex and parties are reluctant to disclose
their terms, which could leave them open to corruption. 199 In Norway, for
example, the awarding of each license and the criteria used to establish the
194. Daniel Johnston, International Exploration Economics, Risk, and Contract Analysis,
41-42 (PennWell Books, 2003),
195. Iledare (n 4).
196. Farouk Al-Kasim, Tina Søreide and Aled Williams, ‘Grand Corruption in the
Regulation of Oil’ [2008] U4 Issue 7.
197. Nicholas Shaxson, ‘Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse’ (2007) 83 International
Affairs 1123.
198. Al-Kasim, Søreide and Williams (n 188).
199. Smith and others (n 1).
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award is recorded in the public domain. 200 It is only in these instances that
the public can adequately judge the effectiveness and stability of the
agreements as well as the decision-making of public servants and
government officials who were involved in the creation of the contracts.201
7. Conclusion
Based on the previous sections, several concluding points can be made.
The first point is that the best HGI will depend on the terms and conditions
agreed upon by the parties. In other words, it is not a matter of which type,
but one of negotiation. Different HGIs could offer advantages and benefits,
but any HGI can be adjusted to fit most interests. The second point is that
the political, cultural and legal backgrounds of each country are equally
relevant for they might prevent certain HGI from being negotiated. The
clearest example is that of historical concessions in the Middle East. The
third point is that the expectations of the relevant stakeholders might vary
from country to country (e.g. export or import based, robust economic
development or not) and investor to investor (e.g. small, large, major oil
and gas companies). This is why in principle any HGI could work in any
given country. The fourth point is that it is difficult to implement a stable
HGI in a long-term project. This is why some countries simply do not offer
stability (i.e. most Western countries) or end up re-negotiating at some
point. Flexibility remains the key to a successful long-term cooperation of
parties in HGI.

200. ‘Norway: The Petroleum Act and the Licensing System’ <http://www.
norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/the-petroleum-act-and-the-licensing-system/ > accessed on
March 2018.
201. Ibid pg. 80
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Appendix - Summaries and Examples of Host Government Instruments
8. Summaries and Examples Host Government Instruments Mentioned
As mentioned previously, the contractual types of HGIs are grouped into
three main categories; (1) Concession Agreements (2) PSCs and (3) Service
Contracts. It is possible that a fourth option could exist in the form of joint
venture agreement and a fifth option in the form of hybrid contract, in
which some countries might create an HGI that combines features of
different regimes. 202 A sixth category would be a preliminary contract
without exclusive rights, such as a reconnaissance contract or study
agreement, which could lead to one of the three main aforementioned
contracts.
The key summary behind each of these three main types of HGIs along
with relevant practical examples will be described below.
8.1. Concession Agreement
The petroleum concession203 is an agreement that grants title of the oil
and gas resources (which may include reserves) to the International Oil
Company (IOC) that is developing these resources. Historically, the
agreement conferred exclusive rights within large areas for long periods
against a mere obligation to pay some smaller bonuses, annual sums, and/or
royalties.204 Otherwise, the concession holders were exempted from any
taxes or duties, including income/profit tax.205 One famous example is the
202. For example, this might be a PSC with a royalty system or a Service Contract with a
buy-back option as we will analyze later in this paper. In addition, the host government
could offer more than one HGI in different areas of the country or at different bidding
rounds. However, for the purposes of this paper we will focus on these 3 conventional types
of HGI.
203. This subsection draws upon Section I.A. Petroleum Concessions, from Catalin
Gabriel Stanescu, Eduardo G Pereira & Aaron Koenck – Petroleum Concessions, Licenses
and Leases: “Same-Same but Different”?, LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources, Vol
VIII, 2019, forthcoming, p. 6-9.
204. RAYMOND F. MIKESELL, PETROLEUM COMPANY OPERATIONS AND AGREEMENTS IN
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Taylor and Francis.London, 2016), p. 21 and fn 3.
205. TAVERNE, supra note 1, at33. For instance, the D’Arcy concession established
revenues of 16% as a “quid pro quo for complete fiscal exemption.” See ZUHAYR MIKDASHI,
A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE EASTERN OIL CONCESSIONS, 1901-65, 12–14 (F. A.
Praeger 1966). The 1925 Iraqi concession agreement also contained a complete fiscal
exemption. See ibid67. The worst situation appears to have been in Kuwait, where the
royalty payments were lower than in all neighboring countries, doubled by a complete lack
of guarantees. See id. at 82-83; see also TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 41.
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D’Arcy Concession (Persia, 1901) that granted its holder an exclusive right
over almost the entire country for a term of 60 years and did not impose any
tax liability towards the state. 206 Similar terms existed in concessions
granted by Iraq,207 Saudi Arabia,208 or Kuwait.209
The contextual background which “allowed” the original petroleum
concessions to be awarded no longer exist. 210 It is unthinkable that another
D’Acry211 or S. Pearson & Son212 concession will ever be implemented
again. Traditional type of concessions have been removed and replaced
with agreements more favorable to the host nation. Many social,
environmental, economic, and political pressures have forced new versions
of concessions, along with new types of granting instruments that better
serve the purposes of individuals and governments alike. 213 In fact, the
abandonment of the old concession system is a product of many developing
nation-states asserting their sovereignty and increasing sophisticated
political systems.214
A concession agreement is drawn up for the HG to grant exclusive rights
to a concessionaire to explore and produce hydrocarbon resources in a
given area over a certain period. The agreement will set out the terms and
conditions that cover the payment, assessed on production, of taxation by
the concessionaire. On signing the agreement, the concessionaire has the
right to: conduct exploration and if successful to develop any discovery
resulting from that exploration; to take ownership of the oil and gas
produced; and to dispose of such production without restriction. While
some HGs issue a license that covers both E&P, others only issue a license
for the initial exploration, which may lead the host government to issue a
production concession if any commercial discovery is made. HGIs need to
ensure that, if the initial exploration was successful, the concessionaire does
206. TAVERNE, supra note 1, at 34. See alsoCAMERON PETER, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF NORTH SEA OIL 11–12 (New York, Academic Press Inc.
1983).
207. MIKDASHI, A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE EASTERN OIL CONCESSIONS, 1901-65,
105 (F. A. Praeger 1966)
208. Id. at 80.
209. TAVERNE, supra note 1 at 36.
210. Ernest E. Smith, From Concessions to Service Contracts, 27 Tulsa L. J. 493 (2013).
p. 3
211. Granted 500,000 Squares miles in 1901. Id. at 3
212. Mexican government granted a concession to almost all of the Federally owned
lands along the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 4.
213. Id. at 42–48.
214. Id. at 34–35. Also: MIKESELL, 2016, p. 23-25.
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not encounter any unreasonable obstacles in obtaining a production
concession.
It is important to mention the classification of concession agreements.
The literature identifies two theories concerned with determining the legal
nature of concession agreements. On one hand, they are perceived as
contracts, which confers upon them a binding character (historical Middle
East concessions),215 meaning that unilateral change or termination entitles
the aggrieved party to obtain compensation. 216 On the other hand, the
concessions are perceived as hybrid forms – such as administrative
contracts, governed by a special set of rules, addressing and imposing limits
to the pressing issue of unilateral change, without banning it altogether
(France, Germany, Brazil, the Danish Sole Concession and to a certain
extent, Romania).217
A creation of French law, the administrative contract is subject to the
regulatory power of the state and therefore allows for modification of the
contract pursuant to the state's regulatory powers that would not be allowed
between purely private parties.218 A further interaction between the public
and private nature of concessions occurs in certain legal systems, which
either require parliamentary approval of the concession, by a specific law or
are considering such requirements for their legal system (e.g. Ghana,
Tunisia, Iran, and Azerbaijan).219
215. TERENCE DAINTITH, THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENCES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 223 (University of Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law
Studies 1981).
216. When historical concessions were entered in the Middle East, there were neither
petroleum, nor tax legislations in place. The legal framework governing operations was
limited to the concession agreement itself. These agreements were of obvious contractual
nature. This interpretation can be seen in Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil (Aramco)
(1963) 27 ILR 117 and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya (1977) 53 ILR 389. In both
cases, the arbitrators held that the concessions were more than mere administrative acts
subject to the whims of the state.
217. VIBE ULFBECK, RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES FOR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN
THE ARCTIC, THE EXAMPLE OF GREENLAND, 33–34 (Vibe Ulfbeck, Anders Møllmann & Bent
Ole Gram Mortensen eds., Routledge 2016).. For details concerning the importance of
determining whether the license is a contract or a regulatory act, see HAMMERSON, supra
note 7, at 62–63.
218. See Henry Cattan, THE LAW OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA (Willis L. M. Reese, Foreign Parker School of and Law Comparative eds, 1967).
219. See Wissem Heni & Amir Shafaie, Tunisia’a Draft Law on Parliamentary Approval
of Oil Contracts: Miss Transparency Opportunity?, RESOURCE GOVERNANCE (Mar. 15,
2017) https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/tunisia’s-draft-law-parliamentary-approval-oilcontracts-missed-transparency-opportunity; Gilbert Ankrah & Richie Osei Asiedu, Ghana:
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Countries that have adopted and still use the system of concessions or
any of its variations (e.g. licenses or leases) include North America (led by
US and Canada), Europe (led by Norway, the UK, Sweden, Denmark and
the Netherlands), South American (led by Brazil and Argentina); others
include Australia, South Africa, Morocco and New Zealand. 220
8.1.1. Practical Example: Brazilian Concession Agreement
The Brazilian upstream sector has suffered several changes within its
history. Initially it started as a “free market” system between the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. Later it moved to a nationalistic and state
monopoly for nearly five decades under the control of Petrobras, then it reopened the market at the end of the 20th century under a competitive licence
regime. More recently it moved back to create a higher level of state
intervention as it changed from the licence regime that existed in the in late
1990’s to a hybrid regime created by the combination of a licence regime
and production sharing regime. But why?
The Brazilian government could have arranged its fiscal system in order
to achieve the same financial income irrespective of the model adopted.
From a legal or economic point of view it was not required to move from a
single licence regime since the late 90’s to a hybrid regime with licence and
production sharing regime at this present moment. This process would have
been fairly straightforward as the royalty and special participation processes
were already in place and could have been increased in order to achieve the
same financial benefits expected from the new PSA regime. The special
participation would be much easier to be changed as it would not require
the approval from its national congress. So, a fiscal adjustment in the
petroleum legal regime would have allowed for development on the pre-salt
reserves within a shorter period of time, as well as maintaining the stability
and progress of the previous petroleum regime. M.R. de Oliveira gives a
good example of this matter:

Parliament to Approve Petroleum Explration Contract Between Ghana and AGM
Petroleum, ALL AFRICA (Nov. 29, 2013) https://allafrica.com/stories/201312020636.html;
Alireza Ramezani, Iran Closer to Rolling Out New Oil Project Contracts, AL-M ONITOR
(Aug. 24, 2016) https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/iran-petroleumcontract-ipc-final-confirmation-parliament.html;Nermin Rehimova, Azerbaijan Parliament
Ratifies Agreements on “Umid-Babek” Block, AZ REPORT NEWS AGENCY (May 2, 2017,
4:36 PM) https://report.az/en/energy/azerbaijan-parliament-ratified-agreements-on-umidbabek-block/.
220. Ibid
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“(...) PSA offers no additional benefits to Brazil, since a simple
change in contractual regime will not necessarily increase the
government take. In addition, comparing both regimes, it was
proven that it is feasible to arrive at similar government take
whatever type of contract is in force.” 221
Why was there a need to implement a new petroleum regime to develop
the well known and prospective Pre-Salt area? 222 The most reasonable
answer stems from political and national security issues. It is possible to
suggest that the creation of a new NOC in the Brazilian petroleum regime
has clear political motivation, which is directly related to the rationale
behind the new PSA.223
Although most developing countries face popular claims to protect
national resources and feel uncomfortable delegating proprietary rights to
an IOC, this, in theory, should not apply to the currently Brazilian scenario
as the state monopoly was relaxed in 1995 and it was working fairly well
for over ten years. However, sustained political stability is hard to achieve
in any country and these recent changes within the Brazilian Upstream
sector seem to be a regressive measure towards national restriction from
private and foreign investment. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight
that some of the restrictions of the PSA regime (e.g. operatorship) have
been made more flexible due to the financial crises and scandals suffered by
Petrobras.224
8.1.2. Practical Example: Malaysian Concession Agreement
Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy with an elected Parliament. It was
a British protectorate and it achieved independence in 1957. Since
independence, Malaysia has had one of the best economic records in Asia,
221. M.R. de Oliveira,’The Pre-Salt Oil Reserves in Brazil: To What Extent Is It Really
Necessary to Adopt a Production Sharing Agreement System?’, 21 OGEL (2009), 21.
222. The ‘pre-salt area’ is described in the Federal Law No 12.351/2010 (“Pre-salt Law”)
and subject to a production sharing regime.
223. Johnston has the same perspective as he states that ´At first PSCs and concessionary
systems appear to be quite different. They have major symbolic and philosophical
differences, but these serve more of a political function than anything else.` Daniel Johnston,
International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and production sharing contracts (Penwell,
Oklahoma 1994), p. 39. In addition, Bindemann suggests in his conclusion that “In that
sense it can be argued that a PSA is a political rather than an economic contract.” Kirsten
Bindemann, Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis (Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, Oxford 1999), p. 88.
224. See Federal Decree no. 9.041/2017.
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with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growing at an average 6.5% per
annum for almost 50 years.225 Natural resources are one of the major
contributors to the growth of the Malaysian economy. 226
In general, people might get mislead with the history of petroleum
industry in Malaysia. It might be perceived that the productions of oil and
gas were only started when PETRONAS was founded in 1974.227 However,
such perception is incorrect. The petroleum industry had in fact begun long
time ago during the British colonial period. The British colonial masters
had exploited hydrocarbons and other minerals in the country including tins
prior to the independence of Malaya in 1957.228 Petroleum exploration in
Malaysia commenced in the beginning of the 20th century in Sarawak,
where oil was first discovered in 1909 and first produced in 1910. 229 The oil
companies in Malaysia had been previously operating under a concession
system.
Post-independence, Malaysia inherited and continued using the same
concession system. In fact, more concessions were awarded to Shell and
Esso to explore oil and gas in the deep-water of Malaysia.230 Under this
system, the IOCs were given extensive rights over a certain area, including
potential reserves contained in the oilfield. 231 On this point, the entire area
of development expenses would be borne by the IOCs in which they had
significant freedom of contract and procurement rights, technology
decisions, while local host government had almost limited right to make
decision except for several matters pertaining to environmental and safety
regulations.232 In exchange for these rights, the IOC was obliged to pay the
government the royalties and taxes.
225. Sani Saidu, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Production Sharing Contracts of Selected
Developing Countries: Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia and Equatorial Guinea’ (2014) 2 J.
Finance & Acc. 34.
226. Shing Chyi Chua and Tick Hui Oh, ‘Review on Malaysia’s National Energy
Developments: Key Policies, Agencies, Programmes and International Involvements’ (2010)
14 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Rev. 2916.
227. Anas Alam Faizli, ‘Is Malaysia’s Rigid Fiscal Regime the Best Recipe for Petronas’
Success?’, Rich Malaysia, Poor Malaysian - Essays on Energy, Economy and Education
(Gerakbudaya Enterprise Petaling Jaya, Malaysia 2012).
228. For examples, Royal Dutch Shell Oil exploration started in Miri offshore in 1910,
and along with Esso, built the first refinery in 1914. The first pump station, Esso was erected
in Kuala Lumpur in 1921.
229. Razmahwata bin Mohamad Razalli, ‘The Malaysian Oil and Gas Industry : An
Overview’ in Ridwin G Candiah (ed), Jurutera, vol 1 (IEM 2005).
230. Faizli (n 227).
231. Ibid.
232. Ibid.
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Original Areas Awarded to IOCs Under Concession System233
Location

Peninsular
Malaysia

Sabah

Sarawak

Company

Area
(square
kilometers)

Onshore/ Offshore

Mobil Malaysia
Exploration Company

31,997

Offshore

Esso Production
Malaysia Incorporated

72,520

Offshore

Continental Oil
Company

52,839

Offshore

Sabah Shell Petroleum
Company

26,374

Offshore and Onshore

Aquitane Petroleum
Company (S. E. A.)

6,838

Offshore and Onshore

Esso Production
Malaysia Incorporated

19,891

Offshore and Onshore

Sabah Teiseki Oil
Company Sdn. Bhd.

6,630

Offshore and Onshore

Oceanic Exploration And
Development
Corporation

1,469

Onshore

Sarawak Shell Berhad

177,720

Offshore and Onshore

A conventional concession-type relationship of IOC with the hostgovernment was governed by the Petroleum Mining Act 1966 and the
Petroleum Income Tax Act 1967. IOCs were operating under the system of
233. Chung Sooi Keong, ‘Ten Years of Petroleum Exploration in Malaysia’ (1977) 11
United Nations ESCAP, CCOP Technical Bulletin.
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concession were given significant freedom in the management of petroleum
resources and control the ownership of all assets, and crude oil and gas
produced. In return they paid royalty to the HG amounting to between 8 to
11 percent of output produced and sold after 5 years of production and
corporate income taxes at the rate of 50 percent to the Federal Government.
Posted price was used as the base for income tax payments.
It is important to note that after the 1973 oil embargo, the oil-producing
countries of the world realized the importance of monitoring their own
petroleum resources.234 In Malaysia, it led to the legislation of the
Petroleum Development Act (PDA) in 1974 and the formation of a national
oil company to ensure that the nation’s petroleum resources could be
developed in line with the desires and wishes of the nation. This
corporation was known as the ‘Perbadanan Petroliam Nasional’ (National
Petroleum Corporation) or PETRONAS.235 Subsequent to the legislation,
Malaysia switched over from the concession system to the PSC model.
8.1.3. Practical Example: Libyan Concession
The classic concession model was the initial arrangement between the
Libyan government and the IOCs for petroleum exploration and production,
and the granting of concessions began soon after approval of the Petroleum
Law in 1955. In terms of ownership of oil and gas, the Law stated in Article
(1) that hydrocarbons found in their natural state in the subsoil layers of
Libya are regarded as state-owned property. The primary objective of the
Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955 had been to attract and encourage IOCs to
invest in Libya, diverting their historical interest away from the Middle
East.
Concessionaires were granted rights that covered vast areas, and the
duration of the concession was considerable, typically fifty years, and some
of them are still in operation (e.g., Wintershall). The country was divided
into four zones. 236 With regard to relinquishment, concessions had to be
reduced to 75% of their original size within five years, 50% within eight
years, and to 33⅓% within 10 years for areas located in the Zones I and II,
234. Hamdan and others (n 29).
235. Khalid Abdul Rahim and Audrey Liwan, ‘Oil and Gas Trends and Implications in
Malaysia’ [2012] Energy Pol’y. 262.
236. Zone I represented the territory of Tripolitania, Zone II represented the territory
north of the 28th parallel in Cyrenaica, Zone III represented the territory south of the 28th
Parallel in Cyrenaica, and Zone IV represented the territory of Fezzan. Concessionaires were
granted rights that covered vast areas – in Zones I and II the maximum area was 30,000
square kilometres (km2), while in Zones III and IV it was 80,000 km2.
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and 25% for areas located in Zones III and IV. The concessionaires were
given exemption from export and import duties and total control of
petroleum exploitation, with freedom to explore for oil under the most
flexible terms. In the case of discovery of commercial quantities of oil, they
had the right to produce and export any amount of crude oil at their own
quoted prices. The government had no claim on the proceeds of oil
revenues apart from the right to receive specified royalty and taxes. No
revision of the concessions terms could be effected without prior
consultation of the companies. In actual fact, in retrospect, the law was
clearly drafted in line with the requirements of the oil companies, to ensure
total control and take full responsibility in running the petroleum activities
and operations. Fiscally, they can be described as a tax-royalty system,
within which, effectively, the role of the Libyan government was restricted
to that of a “royalty and tax collector”.
The royalty and tax rates had been maintained at the original level
provided for in the concessionary principle of 12½ and 50 percent
respectively. The posted prices remained low at the same level as during the
concessions period237. It is clear that during the time when the original
concessions were granted the Government, due to lack of experience, was
reasonably satisfied with the conditions and share of the revenue provided
by the major companies. Moreover, at the time the Government was
influenced by the dominant political stance of the oil companies’ home
governments. This situation effectively put the government in a feeble
bargaining position, which the major companies exploited. The dominant
position of the major companies ensured that they maintained this situation
and prevented any improvements in the posted price, royalty and income
taxes throughout the sixties. However, these circumstances were radically
changed through the nationalization policy of the new government in the
early 1970s.
In its approach to the restructuring of the Libyan oil industry in 1970, the
new government was keen to secure two important objectives. Firstly,
operational control, ranging from exploration, field development and
production levels, had to be wrested from the IOCs and placed firmly in the
hands of the Libyan government. Secondly, a fair price reflecting the
intrinsic quality of Libyan crude and its geographical advantages over Gulf
crude had to be secured in international markets, and the government’s
share of revenue generated from this had to be significantly increased.

237. Morris Albert Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Johns Hopkins Press 1972).
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Turning to perceptions of participation at senior levels in the Libyan
Government, at the time there were three fundamental issues between the
Government and the oil companies:1)the government’s desire for a fair
posted price for its crude, 2) a wish to reduce production levels, and 3) the
nationalization process. Regardless of the OPEC Resolution relating to
participation agreements, Libyan thinking had gone far beyond the two
basic terms advocated by OPEC for its members - host government
participation to begin at 25 percent and to increase gradually to 51 percent,
and compensation at updated book values.
After its success in its participation and nationalisation initiatives, the
Libyan government went further towards increasing revenue from its
upstream oil sector. It rapidly followed OPEC in increasing its share of
revenue from royalties and taxes in line with OPEC’s Geneva and Ecuador
meetings in 1974. In fact in the period from 1971–1974 the Libyan
government made several fiscal terms changes to the Petroleum Law, which
increased royalty from 12½% to 14½% and then to 16.67%, with taxes also
gradually increased from their level in the original concession 50%, to 55%,
then to 60% and finally to 65%. In addition, after long and acrimonious
negotiations with the IOCs to increase the posted price, the government
achieved this through the 1 September 1970 settlement, the Caracas Posted
Prices Agreement in December 1970, the Tehran Agreement of 14 February
1971 and the Tripoli Agreement of 20 March 1971. As a result, the Libyan
posted price was increased from $2.23 a barrel in 1970 to $3.386 a barrel by
1973. Through this amendment, the government’s share in the profits
realised by the concessionaires was boosted considerably. Given the fact
that the government held the majority in its partnerships with the oil
companies, it can be said that the government controlled high portion of oil
proceeds.
In any case, the classical concessions were in many ways less favourable
to government than were those obtained by other producing countries in
terms of the economic and financial benefits. However, the raison d’être of
these terms was their attractiveness to the IOCs. This turned out to be one
of the key features that contributed to rapid growth of the Libyan upstream
sector during the period from mid of 1950s to early 1970s.
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8.2. Production Sharing Contracts (PSC’s)
The idea of the state and companies creating an enterprise to share the
production of hydrocarbon resources was first developed in Bolivia in the
1950s, but only took a firm hold when the Production Sharing Contract
(PSC) was introduced in Indonesia in 1966. 238 Here, the extraction of
petroleum is no longer limited primarily to a royalty and tax licence, with
the IOC receiving a mining title or license to extract oil, for the simple
reason that the IOC is not in fact the owner of the production. Although
different types of PSCs evolved in different countries in the years that
followed, these new arrangements shared common fundamentals. Among
the main ones are the cost recovery aspect, referred to as cost oil, the profit
split features, and in some cases taxation While fiscal elements, such as
taxes, were usually the subject of national legislation, others were subject to
negotiation as stated in individual agreements. 239
The first model of this kind in Indonesia was that between the US
consortium known as IIAPCO and the Indonesian National Oil Company
Pertamina, and was devised by Dr. Ibnu Sutowo, the President –Director of
Pertamina. Following this model there was no royalty and taxation imposed
on the second party, because Pertamina owned all production inclusive of
crude stored at export terminals. IIAPCO was allowed to recover annually
approximately 40 percent of its exploration and operations costs. The 60
percent left was designated as profit oil to be split 65: 35 percent in favour
of Pertamina. Further, when crude oil production exceeded 75,000 b/d,
Pertamina received 67.5 percent and IIAPCO the remaining 32.5 percent.
Furthermore, as generally applied to all subsequent Indonesian PSCs, the
IOCs had to sell 25 percent of its profit oil to the Pertamina under a
domestic market obligation, usually at 15 percent of market price. This
raised the State’s take yearly production from about 39 percent to
approximately 46 percent240.

238. Karwan Dhahir Saber, ‘Kurdistan’s Politics Issues Regarding Production Sharing
Contract with Iraqi Central Government and Analyses Whether This Contract Best Suits
Kurdistan or Iraq as Whole’.
239. Otman and Bunter (n 235).
240. Ibid.
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In the succeeding decades, the PSC evolved successfully in line with the
huge transformations and consolidations which took place in the global oil
industry. The “Indonesian Formula” as it became known in petroleum
circles proved highly successful in satisfying the aspirations of the host
governments, providing them with control over all phases in the oil
industry, from exploration through production to marketing. At the same
time these PSCs provided a legal and commercial framework within which
the HGs felt as secure as IOCs to certain extent.241
PSCs are now used extensively in agreements for oil and gas E&P,
particularly in developing countries, even though a number of them might
be considered as hybrid HGIs.242 The terms of the PSC determine
ownership and allocation of production, usually expressed as a percentage
which is calculated on the level of production, with each party free to
monetise or commercialise its respective share subject to the agreed terms
and conditions after deducting the costs which are known as profit oil. 243
Under the PSC system, the investor will usually only receive a share of the
oil or gas produced rather than the entire production. 244
However, the HG neither reimburses, nor compensates the relevant
contractor if there isno commercial discovery.245 On the other hand, if
exploration is a success, and oil or gas can be produced commercially,
production will be shared between the contractor and the state according to
the formula(s) agreed on in the contract.246 Unlike the concession
agreement, the government receives a specific share of oil or gas after the
deduction of the permitted costs has been taken by the investor, known as
cost oil or cost recovery. 247
Countries utilizing PSCs include but are not limited to Nigeria,
Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Cyprus, Sudan, Egypt,

241. Ibid.
242. .Allen & Overy 2013. Guide to Extractive Industries Documents – Oil & Gas.
Available
from:
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/geiprogram.pdf
accessed on 1st October 2018.
243. Saul Estrin and others, ‘Profit‐ Sharing in OECD Countries: A Review and Some
Evidence’ (1997) 8 Business strategy review 27.
244. The Investor might receive the entire production in an early stage if the HG does not
establish a ceiling for the cost recovery.
245. Putrohari and others (n 25).
246. Saidu (n 220).
247. Granita R Layungasri, ‘Comparative Study of Indonesian PSC and Malaysian PSC:
Challenges and Solution’ (Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law & Policy
(CEPMLP), University of Dundee 2010).
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Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan.
8.2.1. Practical Example: Recent Indonesian PSC Changes
As previously mentioned, the Indonesian government, through its
Regulation No 8 of 2017, required that for all new PSCs, a “gross split”
mechanism will determine the allocation of production from petroleum
operations between the HG and the IOC. This new system will increase the
investors’ share of the gross production in exchange for the removal of the
existing, traditional cost recovery mechanism outlined earlier. The main
rational behind such decision was due to lower oil price combined with
higher cost recovery payments.
Under a “gross split” PSC, gross production will be allocated between
the HG and the IOC based solely on production splits, without involving an
operational cost recovery mechanism. On this basis, the Investor’s
entitlement to production for each lifting period, and the resulting revenues,
will be determined solely on its gross split percentage, which is determined
on a pre-tax basis.
Clearly the absence of cost recovery in gross split PSCs will mean that
the State’s entitlement to oil and gas in the early years of production under
a gross split PSC will be higher. As a result, Investor may need to wait
longer to recover their investment costs under gross split PSCs. This
changes the dynamics of a contractor’s investment and potentially increases
their investment and funding risk. Investors will likely place increased
emphasis on reserves and production forecasts when making their
investment decisions and may seek to mitigate their cost exposure where
there is more uncertainty in terms of investment recovery (e.g. when
agreeing firm work commitments) 248. Nevertheless, the cost recovery
system was not completely removed as some depreciation and/or tax
deductions might be allowed in the new system.
In any case, the new system adopted in Indonesia encourages higher
performance of local content and other parameters in order to allocate
higher profit share to the investors.

248. .Ashurst, 2017.Indonesia abandons cost recovery mechanism for new production
sharing contracts. Available at:https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/
indonesia-abandons-cost-recovery-mechanism/ accessed on 1 June 2019.
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However, it remains to be seen if other countries will follow the lead of
Indonesia once again, as these proposed changes could eliminate the
inefficiency or potential corruption in PSC systems.
8.2.3. Practical Example: Malaysian PSC
In the early 1970’s, several countries have moved from traditional
concession approach to the PSC.249 In the formative phase of PETRONAS,
there was a close relationship between the heads of PETRONAS and
PERTAMINA i.e. the Indonesian national oil company, whereby
PERTAMINA offered technical assistance and legal advice to Malaysian
counterparts.250 In the mid-1970s, Malaysia switched over from the
concession system to the PSC model. 251 It provided incentives for IOCs to
continue to produce oil and invest in exploration while at the same time
prevent high rental level of capture by foreign oil companies. ‘Under a
249. Faizli (n 222).
250. Ibid.
251. Muhammad Zukhairi Muhd Salehudin and Mohd Farizal Farhan Abd Ghafar,
‘Getting Involved in Upstream Oil & Gas Sector in Malaysia: A Legal Introduction’ (Azmi
& Associates, 2013) <www.azmilaw.com> accessed 2 June 2019.
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legislation enacted in 1985, PETRONAS is required to hold a 15 per cent
minimum equity in PSC’s with all foreign and private companies.’252
‘PETRONAS as a regulator awarded PSC to a number of international
O&G companies, including to its wholly owned exploration and production
(“E&P”) subsidiary, PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCSB)’. 253 In this
regard, IOCs that intended to carry out exploitation of hydrocarbon in
Malaysia had to enter into a PSC or another form of E&P arrangement with
PETRONAS.254 Under the PSCs, all risks and financing hadto be borne and
provided by the Investors in exchange for an agreed portion of the total
production, including recovery costs through the expenses of oil or gas
costs. 255 The Investors were required to observe the minimum level of
commitment for the operations especially in relation to work and finance. 256
In addition, the Investors were also required to seek various approvals from
PETRONAS throughout all phases of operations.257 Failure to comply with
these requirements resulted in automatic relinquishment of the rights to
carry out the upstream activities with PETRONAS. 258
To date, PETRONAS has entered into 101 PSCs.259 The first was signed
with Shell in 1976 with revisions made in 1985.260 Later, two sets of deep252. Australian Trade and Investment Commission, ‘Oil and Gas to Malaysia: Trends
and Opportunities’ (Australian Government) <https://www.austrade.gov.au/Australian/
Export/Export-markets/Countries/Malaysia/Industries>.
253. Bank Pembangunan, ‘Annual Report 2011: Report on Malaysia Oil and Gas
Exploration’ (2011) 63.
254. Azmi Mohd Ali, Mohd Rasheed Khan and Stefan Führer, ‘Malaysia’s Booming Oil
and Gas Industry’ (Azmi & Associates, 2014) <http://www.azmilaw.com/images/stories/
PDF/Articles/Malaysias_Booming_Oil__Gas_Industry.pdf> accessed 2 June 2019.
255. Wan M Zulhafiz, ‘An Empirical Study on the Contractual Risk Allocation
Provisions and Indemnity and Hold Harmless Clauses in the Oilfield Service Contracts in
Malaysia’, Paper Proceedings on ‘Second International Conference on Interdisciplinary
Legal Studies (ICILS) 2015’ on 9th-10th June 2015 in Toronto, Canada (Unique Conference
Canada, June 2015).
256. Zulhafiz, ‘Perception of Contractual Risk Allocation in the Oil and Gas Contracts in
Malaysia’ (n 47).
257. Wan Zulhafiz, ‘Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977: Does It Provide a Good Model in
Regulating Risk Allocation Provisions in Oilfield Contracts in Malaysia?’ (2015) 8
International Journal of Trade & Global Market 3.
258. Wan Mohd Zulhafiz Wan Zahari, ‘Unbalanced Indemnities: A Comparative
Analysis of Risk Allocation in Oilfield Service Contracts in Malaysia, the UK and USA’
(University of Aberdeen 2016) 4.
259. Ali, Khan and Führer (n 254).
260. The Star Online, ‘Miri – from Where It All Began’ (20 May 2005)
<https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2005/05/20/miri--from-where-it-all-began>
accessed 29 September 2019.
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sea PSCs were introduced in 1993 and onshore PSC terms were developed
in 1995.261 Recently, PETRONAS has taken initiative by introducing
Enhanced Oil Recovery (“EOR”) PSC Terms in order to attract and reward
IOCs to deploy the EOR techniques. 262
8.2.4. Practical Example: Libyan EPSAs
In case of Libya, the rise in prices during 1973–1974 led to massive
profits for the oil companies under the classic concession terms and
participation agreements. This turned out to be one of the major factors
driving the emergence of the first Libyan PSC (Exploration and Production
Sharing Agreement, EPSA-I) in 1974, followed by EPSA-II in 1980, the
latter introduced during the second oil market shock following the Iranian
Revolution in 1979.
Two main factors lead to the Libyan government’s introduction of the
EPSA-I. Firstly, the Libyan petroleum authorities, after the completion of
the nationalization or participation process of its oil industry in the first half
of the seventies, felt reasonably confident about their ability to exercise
control over all stages of the oil production cycle, from exploration to
selling. The creation of the Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) 263
was presented with a very challenging agenda by the Libyan Government.
–It hadto harness the potential oil and gas wealth of the unexplored and
undeveloped areas of the country, and toacquire foreign capital and
technological expertise to do so. Secondly, global oil prices increased by
approximately 400% in less than half a year, during 1973-1974. In these
circumstances, the oil companies were seen to be making excessive profits
under the classical concession-type agreements.

261. Bindemann (n 101).
262. ‘PETRONAS Activity Outlook 2019-2021’ <https://www.petronas.com/ws/sites/
default/files/Media/PETRONAS Activity Outlook 2019-2021.pdf> accessed 29 September
2019.
263. The Libyan National Oil Corporation (LNOC) was established under Law No. 24
passed on 12 November 1970 and which gave it the right and responsibility for oil sector
operations. It was later reorganized under decision No. 10, 1979 by the General Secretariat
of the General People's Congress, to undertake the realization of the objectives of the
development plan in the areas of petroleum , supporting the national economy through
increasing , developing and exploiting the oil reserves and operating and investing in those
reserves, to realize optimum returns. In carrying out its activities, LNOC may enter into
participation agreements with other companies and corporations carrying out similar
activities. This event was, effectively, the commencement of the re-construction of Libyan
fiscal policy for the oil industry.
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It is useful to consider how the Libyan EPSA I model differed from
similar type of agreements used in other producing countries at the time 264.
The Libyan first model of PSC did not set aside any part of the production
for cost recovery. Instead, the investor received a fixed percentage of
production. This percentage was different for offshore and onshore acreage
with the majority of agreements concluded based on the 85:15 percent

264. Duration: This was between 30 to 35 years, including an exploration period of
around 5 years.
Distribution of Costs and Expenses: 1) All of the exploration expenditure was undertaken by
the foreign company, which essentially comprised drilling of the appraisal wells. An
exploration program attached to the EPSA gave mobilisation details of projected number of
wells to be drilled, seismic crews, and drilling equipment. However it was the amount of the
initial minimum exploration expenditure rather than a work programme that determined the
IOC’s obligation here. 2) Further costs and expenses, including development and operating
expenditure and overheads after the exploration phase were to be shared between the
IOC/LNOC in proportion to their share of produced crude. 3) LNOC’s share of development
expenditure was treated as an interest bearing loan repayable by LNOC when the total
production attained an agreed quantity or at a specific volume of export production.
Repayment was to be annually, extendable up to 20 years. 4) Where a contracting party
defaulted in providing its share of costs, this entitled the non-defaulting party to advance a
like amount, charging interest to cover the period of the delay. If the delay exceeded 90
days, the non-defaulting party was entitled to offtake the defaulting party’s share of
production to settle outstanding plus interest, with crude valued at the market price.
Production Sharing: Crude oil production was determined by the percentages fixed in the
Agreement. Against the economic and market factors following the first oil shock and the
1973 Arab oil embargo LNOC’s share exceeded 80 percent in most cases of production.
Taxation: The IOC’s production share was exempted from income tax, royalties or any other
government charges.
Management: The company acts as operator on a no loss no profit basis. Petroleum
operations were to be managed by a Management Committee comprising three
representatives, with LNOC appointing two of these, including the Chairman, and the
company a third. This Management Committee was to decide on work programs, operational
budgets and other relevant matters with a simple majority vote final and binding on the
parties.
Sole Risk: The IOC maintained the right of non-participation in any project decided by the
Management Committee if it deemed such project to be uneconomic for the company. In this
case LNOC could proceed with the project at its own cost, with entitlement to all benefits.
Importantly, EPSA-I recognized the right of the IOC to re-enter such a project on agreed
terms.
Title to equipment: LNOC was to own all the equipment purchased by operator in relation to
the work program, from its point of entry into Libyan ports.
Buy-back Provision: The company was granted a first option to buy LNOC share of crude,
subject to advance agreement on the price.
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formula for onshore and 81:19 percent for offshore areas in favour to
LNOC265.
Essentially the EPSA-II terms were not significantly different from those
offered in the first generation EPSA’s in 1974 EPSA-II terms were
generally regarded by foreign investors as too heavily weighted in favor of
LNOC, and were seen as less favorable to them than EPSA-I. Production
sharing under EPSA-II was different depending on the prospects of the
acreage concerned. These were 85:15 percent to LNOC’s advantage for
what was classified as top acreage, 81:19 percent for medium acreage, and
75:25 percent for the least favored acreage, but again the IOC’s share of
output was free of taxes and royalties.
A drop in oil prices during the 1980s had devastating effects on the
Libyan economy as well as on oil companies globally. In 1983 the oil price
was $34 a barrel while in 1986 it was less than $10. The decline in oil
prices adversely affected the capacity of the oil companies` to invest in
petroleum exploration and development in Libya.
These market conditions and the impact of the US companies’
withdrawal from the Libyan oil sector in 1986, exacerbated the LNOC’s
multiple problems which, because of insufficient E&P brought about by
the strict terms of EPSA-I and II, forced a change. To reverse the situation,
the third one (EPSA-III) was announced by the Libyan government in 1988
as a response to changes in the international oil market and an attempt to
attract more participants in new exploration. In this new model the LNOC
adopted flexible contractual terms, including the guaranteeing of cost
recovery by the international oil companies, and the achievement of a larger
and earlier cash flow on investments relative to the previous generation of
agreements. Despite the new attractive terms, however, the Libyan oil
sector was still overwhelmed by a continuing drop in oil prices, and the
political fallout from the sanctions imposed by the US and United Nations.
The lifting of US sanctions against Libya in 2004, and drastic changes in
the geopolitics of the global energy markets in the preceding 30 years made
it imperative for the LNOC to re-evaluate its relationship with the
international oil companies. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the
competitive environment in the industry was characterised by limited
opportunities and abundant financial resources, largely because significant
parts of the world were closed to direct foreign investment and because of
265. WA Otman, ‘Appraising the Libyan Petroleum Agreements: A Comparative
Analysis of Risk Factors & an Evaluation of Their Effectiveness’ (2007) 5 Oil, Gas &
Energy Law Journal (OGEL).
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the prevalence of high oil prices respectively. In the early 1990s, as most
countries started to open up, new opportunities became available to the
IOCs at a time when the available financial resources were scarce, mainly
due to relatively lower oil prices.
Therefore, the Libyan government reacted swiftly and took a major step
in supporting the IOC’s confidence in Libya by introducing its fourth
generation production sharing contract model, or EPSA IV.
The four generations of EPSA vary considerably in their economic,
financial, and legal terms and implications 266, but while there was
considerable continuity and similarity between EPSA-I and II, EPSA-III
was radically different and similar to EPSA-IV.Currently EPSA-IV is the
only contractual form presented by the Libyan government to IOCs wishing
to invest in the Libyan E&P sector.
EPSA-IV was designed and modified to replace all the previous models.
In addition, complete transparency was brought into the bidding process, as
further incentive for IOCs to invest in the Libya
The new terms of EPSA-IV provide for exploration, appraisal,
development and production costs to be recovered very quickly from a
proportion of output, for development costs to be equally shared between
the investor and LNOC, and for profit production share to be split on a
sliding scale. The new EPSA-IV also covered all sizes of discoveries. Small
discoveries could still secure an acceptable return to the IOC as well as
giving it a fair return in the case of major or giant discoveries. Management
Committee rules are similar to EPSA-III, with the only changes made as to
their composition, now four members, two each from LNOC and the
Second Party. Additionally no income taxes, royalties, rents or fees are
levied on the Second Party’s share of production.
The IOCs will totally finance and take the risk of exploration and
appraisal, as well providing training expenses for nationals during the
exploration period. In the event of commercial discovery the development
expenditures and risks are shared fifty-fifty with LNOC. The operation
costs are divided according to the parties’ respective shares of total
production (which vary over lifetime of the field). The system is thus a
production sharing agreement plus contributory state participation. The
investor’s liability for royalties, income tax (including surtax), and other
direct taxes is met by LNOC on his behalf, however excluding the new
bonuses charges which will be paid by the oil company.
266. Johnston, ‘Impressive Libya Licensing Round Contained Tough Terms, No
Surprises’ (n 114).
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Furthermore, the IOCs are in principle subject to customs duties, but in
accordance with the Petroleum Law they are exempt from duties on the
importation of plant, tools, machinery, equipment and materials used for
petroleum operations. It is stipulated under the EPSA rules that whatever is
exempt becomes the property of LNOC immediately after purchase,
whether purchased in Libya, or when landed at a Libyan port if purchased
outside Libya. LNOC also has title to all original data resulting from
operations under EPSA IV.
In this regard, however, although the EPSA-IV terms appear to be very
flexible to IOCs, further consideration needs to be given to several issues.
Firstly, the LNOC first take should be reconsidered, allowing cost recovery
to be maintained at a reasonable level, so that the IOCs can recover their
development and production outlays sooner. Secondly, in the negotiations
for the setting of the A and B factor both LNOC and the IOCs should
carefully consider unknown factors such as fluctuations in the oil price and
unanticipated field conditions involving cost escalations, in order that
potential risks can be contained. Finally, the LNOC also takes into account
the geographical location and infrastructural challenges of the high risk
basins.
The approach Libya took with its EPSA-4 licensing was consistent with
much of the disclosure and transparency initiatives underway worldwide.
Unfortunately, the sealed-bid type of license round with full disclosure does
not work so well for countries with modest or questionable geological
potential. As a result and as a matter of necessity, non-transparent,
negotiated deals will continue to be part of the industry’s future.267
8.3. Service Contracts
Service Contracts, also referred to as advisory agreements, technical
assistance agreements, or operational agreements represent a commercial
arrangement whereby the HG or the NOC grants certain contractual, but
not proprietary rights to an IOC for the extraction of oil and gas. Service
contracts can be divided into two possible sub-categories: RSC and Pure
Service Contracts. The RSC entitles the contractor to carry out E&P
activities at its own risk and expense, while the HG reserves the right to
exclusive ownership of any hydrocarbon reserves resulting from the
exploration. In exceptional cases, the contractor might receive a fee in kind
in the form of entitlement to a share of oil/gas, or the right to purchase the
267. Daniel Johnston, ‘Changing Fiscal Landscape’ (2008) 1 Journal of world energy law
& business 31.
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production from the HG, sometimes at a preferential price; where there is
no commercial production from the exploration, the agreement is
terminated with no legal obligations for any party.
In the terms of a Pure Service Contract, the HG takes on all the risks
associated with the investment and engages a contractor, usually for an
agreed flat rate, to carry out the E&P activities. In this case, the contractor
takes on the role of service provider and has no interests in nor will derive
any benefits from the investment.
The common perception of an IOC is that the contractor is the least
incentivized whenever the HG increases its ownership and control of its
reserves. This is the case for a contractual framework which does not allow
IOCs to retain and/or “book” reserves. Nonetheless, oil and gas service
providers like Halliburton or Schlumberger might fit perfectly well into this
“profile” and eventually the HG could offer higher flat fees or sliding scale
fees, which could encourage IOCs as well.
Service contracts might be common in certain regions or associated with
countries that have suffered previous political unrest or where the
constitution prohibits private companies from retaining ownership of oil
and gas resources (for example, in Iran). Mexico used to be another
example of these constitutional restrictions although the Energy Reform
Decree of 2013 has gone some way to allowing it to move away from such
restrictions268.
8.3.1. Practical Example: Malaysian RSC
Malaysia faces the risk of shortage of natural hydrocarbon resources in
the coming years. Given the continued exploration of more petroleum,
resulting from the increased demand for domestic consumption, Malaysia
cannot ignore and neglect the need to develop existing marginal fields.
Malaysia has identified more than 100 marginal fields, but most of them
have not yet been fully developed. It is important to note that the cost
required to build a small field is somewhat similar to what is needed for a
large field. Therefore, PETRONAS recently proposed an alternative to
attract IOCs to invest in its business, namely the risk service contract
(RSC). ‘Beginning 2011, PETRONAS has adopted the [RSCs] approach as
an alternative to the PSC regime in developing marginal fields. Marginal

268. .Mexico: Decreto por el que se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en Materia de Energía, December
2013.
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fields are those with reserves of less than 30 million barrels of recoverable
oil or oil equivalent.’269
The Contractors are responsible for all exploration expenses including
field development and operation, and undertake to absorb related risks and
these expenses are usually being monitored and approved by PETRONAS
throughout the operation. 270 However, ‘[u]nlike the PSC regime, no
research or abandonment commitment is imposed on the contractor.’271
The Contractors are compensated for any commercial discovery, which
is based upon performance against negotiable performance indicators. 272
The ownership and the control of the reserves, however, remain with
PETRONAS. 273 Under RSC, petroleum taxes would not be imposed to
remuneration fees, however, the tax still applies to companies in Malaysia.
According to Wood Mackenzie, 274 the basic fiscal terms for this new
Malaysian RSC are:
$

Contractor can recover capital and operating costs from annual
revenues, up to a 70% ceiling (capital cost recovery is limited to
120% of the capital cost estimate bid by the contractor).

$

Contractor will then receive a remuneration fee, based on a
negotiable fixed fee per barrel linked to production performance
and capital cost performance multipliers.

$

Any unrecovered costs at end of field life or contract expiry will
be reimbursed

$

Royalty of 10% to be paid by PETRONAS.

$

Contractor is
payments.275

not

liable for

abandonment

or

research

269. CIMB Bank Research, ‘Oil and Gas Sector in for Another Blazing Year’ The Star
newspaper Business (2013) <http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2013/1/23/
business/12612726&sec=business> .accessed on 1 June 2018.
270. Mohd Rasheed Khan and Mohd Farizal Farhan Abd Ghafar, ‘Marginal Fields –
Investment Opportunities in Oil & Gas’ (Asian-Mena Counsel) <http://www.inhouse
community.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/v11i1_JURIS_Malaysia.pdf> accessed 3 June
2018; Bank Pembangunan (n 253) 43.
271. Ibid.
272. Ibid.
273. Eugene Thean Hock Lee, ‘Scope For Improvement: Malaysia’s Oil And Gas Sector’
(Research For Social Advancement - REFSA, 2013) 27 <http://refsa.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/OG-Scoping-Report-Malaysia-final-20130701.pdf>.
274. Wood Mackenzie, ‘South East Asia Upstream Service: Malaysia Country
Overview’ (2012) 41.
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The first RSC was awarded in 2011 to Kencana Petroleum Bhd, Sapura
Crest Petroleum Bhd, and Petrofac Energy Developments Sdn Bhd for the
development of the Berantai field, situated offshore Terengganu,
Malaysia.276 Later, the second RSC was awarded to Dialog Group Bhd, Roc
Oil Malaysia (Holdings) Sdn Bhd and PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd for
Balai Cluster Fields, offshore Sarawak, and the most recent RSC was
awarded to Coastal Energy Co for the Kapal, Banang and Meranti fields. 277
8.3.2. Practical Example: The Iranian Buy Back Contracts
The Iranian Constitution of 1979 prohibited the granting of petroleum
rights on a concessionary basis or holdings of direct equity stakes in
petroleum ventures to foreign companies or individuals. Later on the Oil
Act of 1987 permitted the establishment of contracts between the Iranian
Ministry of Petroleum and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and
local or foreign investors. Such contracts were defined in Article 1 as
“contractual obligations (undertakings) concluded between the Ministry of
Oil or an operational unit or any natural person or legal entity for carrying
out and fulfilling a part of the petroleum operations in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
on the basis of the provisions of this Act”. This gave rise to the Iranian Buy
Back Contract.
Within the legal framework developed above a compromise was reached
to develop the Iranian oil and gas industry despite the constraints imposed
by the 1979 Constitution. This was accomplished by the legal device of the
“buy back contract” as a “form of financing” rather than “foreign direct
investment.”
Under these contracts, the IOC investment is converted to a project loan
(annuity), which is paid back by the revenue generated from a percentage of
the oil produced, derived from a long-term export oil sales agreement
(LTEOSA). In operational terms, the Iranian buy-back can be defined as a
service contract undertaken to achieve specific developmental goals, and
can be summarized as follows:
$

The IOC, acting essentially as a contractor, provides all the
capital required to finance a specific development or
rehabilitation project.

275. Ibid.
276. Khan and Ghafar (n 271).
277. Ibid.
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$

The contractor is reimbursed for capital expenditure and
associated financing costs plus an agreed profit over a specified
period, usually 3-6 years from the date of the first production,
from up to 60-65% of the field’s output. Accordingly, the
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) takes all the risks
associated with oil price fluctuations.

$

The profit or rate of return on the IOC’s investment varies from
project to project, and is normally between 15% and 20%.

$

The Contractor’s profits are paid in equal installments over an
agreed amortization period.

$

NIOC takes over the operation of the field upon the
commencement of production and is responsible for the
operating costs.

$

The Contractor holds no equity in the field. Over the years since
their inception in 1995, the Iranian buyback contracts have
evolved into three types, the Exploration Service Contract, the
Development Service Contract and the Exploration &
Development Service Contract.278

The Iranian government recently changed its contractual regime, offering
more attractive terms for foreign investors under an Iranian Petroleum
Contract. These new terms could be summarized as follows:
$

A longer term (up to a maximum of 20 years from the start of
development operations, with the opportunity to extend further
in the case of IOR/EOR projects);

$

Ability of the foreign investor to be involved in operating the
fields during production;

$

A remuneration fee set as a $/bl or $/scf amount, established in
order to incentivize production efficiency, and linked to
the market prices for oil and condensate and also to the regional
or contractual prices of gas;

$

Incentives for higher risk fields, as well as IOR/EOR projects;
and

278. Waniss A. Otman , April 2007. The Iranian Petroleum Contracts: Past, Present and
Future Perspectives. OGEL, Vol. 5 - issue 2.
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Requirements and incentives for the transfer of technology and
know-how, as well as participation of Iranian entities in all
phases of the project.279

However, the full details of these new terms are not yet disclosed to the
public as only a few IPC have been signed and they are confidential.
8.4 Joint Ventures
In some jurisdictions a joint venture (JV) with a government entity is
required to develop resources as previously mentioned. This strikes a
balance between a NOC wholly developing petroleum assets, which for
obvious reasons can be problematic, and the HG tendering blocks of land to
an IOC, which, for political and historical reasons, may not be possible.
Instead, the JV is a sort of strategic alliance between an IOC and NOC to
produce assets with some level of involvement by both parties. 280
The basic structure of an equity JV is that the host government and IOCs
will agree to form a “partnership” should commercial quantities of crude be
discovered, with the foreign partner financing the exploration phase. If a
commercial discovery is made an operating company is normally
established, with each owning fifty percent of the shares. In general terms
the profit split should ensure that the HG obtains up to approximately 75
percent of the net profit. It should be observed that this profit will be
calculated on basis of the achieved prices and not the declared or posted
prices as in the classical concession contracts. This went a long way to
correct the abuses inherent in the concession system in which discounts,
allowances and under-invoicing were used by the IOC’s to slim down state
share. However, the real distinctive aspect in these agreements was the
positive participation of the national governments in controlling their
natural sources, the gaining of experience in the actual running of
petroleum operations, and role of the national governments in making
critical decisions with regard to the petroleum industry.
8.4.1. Practical Example: MENA Joint Venture Agreements
In the petroleum industry JVs were introduced for the first time in the
Middle East in March 1957, when Iran signed the first such deal with ENI
of Italy (which came to be known as the “Mattei Formula” – marked the
279. The New Iranian Petroleum Contract – Government Approval, Herbert Smith
Freehills, https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/the-new-iranian-petroleumcontract-–-government-approval accessed on the 29th of August 2019.
280. James, NOC-IOC Strategic Alliances, Working Paper #104, October 2011, P. 10.
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beginning of a turning point in relations between producer countries and the
world’s oil companies). The Iranian model was quickly adopted by Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Libya in 1961, 1965, 1967 and 1968,
respectively.
However, Libyan JVs never succeed since the E&P industry was
dominated and controlled by the concessionaires, where the later would not
allow such transformation that would affect their interests in Libya and
other oil producing countries. By the end sixties a new approach of fiscal
regime was emerged among the OPEC oil producing countries. This was
called the “Participation Agreement”.
One of the key factors leading to the emergence of host government
participation was OPEC’s role in promoting guidelines for more
appropriate and just concession agreements among its members, since
throughout early 1970s, the efforts of OPEC had been concentrated on two
main issues. Firstly, the attainment of a reasonable price for its crude in an
international situation suffering from acute financial dislocation. Secondly,
OPEC was pushing all its member countries to negotiate their participation
in production with IOCs. The outcome of this was OPEC’s Resolution
No.139 of 22nd September 1971, the “General Agreement on Participation”
calling for its members to acquire a “sensible” level of participation in oil
operations in their respective countries.
Originally the idea of participation emerged as an indirect consequence
of the views of Sheikh Tariki, the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister. Tariki,
known for his fiery speeches regarding national rights and nationalization
policies against the majors in meetings of the Arab Petroleum Congress and
in OPEC itself, had unambiguously declared that 281 “once we are strong
enough to shut down all the wells, and shut off the pipelines, the companies
will see great light. The world cannot live without Middle East oil 282.”
In this regard, the Libyan government was also influenced by OPEC
guidelines in respect of participation agreements, highlighted in
abovementioned resolution, which called for its members to acquire a
281. These views, perceived as extremist at the time both by the majors and King Feisal,
lead to his firing from his post as Saudi Minister of Oil by Feisal. The appointment of his
replacement, Sheik Yamani, was taken in the Arab world as a pro-western gesture. Yamani
too was aware, on his appointment, that Arab public opinion fully supported nationalization
and the views expressed by Tariki. As a consequence, he had to find an alternative way to
deflect the nationalization issue, a middle path which could at the same time satisfy Arab
public opinion and the majors. This led to his advocacy of host government participation in
Saudi Arabia and the Middle East producing areas.
282. Saturday Evening Post, February 17, 1962.
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‘sensible’ level of participation in oil operations, based on two basic criteria
advocated by OPEC – the host government participation should begin at
25% and to increase gradually to 51%; and compensation for nationalised
assets was to be given at updated book values. 283
Another example is Qatar. Qatar has been trending away from PSC to
JVs. The North Oil Company is a joint venture with the NOC, Qatar
Petroleum, and Total developing and producing on of the largest and most
complex oil fields in the world, the Al-Shaheen Field. 284 Other exceptional
examples may include Eni and PetroChina entering into a memorandum of
understanding to develop unconventional resources in China 285 and Abu
Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) entering into an agreement with
Occidental Petroleum to develop reservoirs in the Shah field southwest of
Abu Dhabi. 286
In any case, it is relevant to point out that a number of these joint
ventures were conducted several decades ago. Nevertheless, they might still
exist in very limited exceptions in the Asia/Middle East (i.e. in Qatar).

283. W Otman and M Bunter, ‘The Libyan Petroleum Industry in the Twenty First
Century: The Upstream’ [2005] Midstream and Downstream Handbook.(OGEL).
284. Mahmmod S., Oil and Gas Regulation in Qatar: Overview, Thompson Reuters:
Practical Law
285. Ernst & Young, National Oil Company Monitor Q1 2011, p. 4, available at
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/National_Oil_Company_Monitor_Q1_2011/$F
ILE/National_Oil_C ompany_Monitor_Q1_2011.pdf.
286. James, NOC-IOC Strategic Alliances, Working Paper #104, October 2011, P. 13.
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